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ABSTRACT
Since before the time of the first digital computers, the workings
of the mind have been compared to that of a machine. With the onset of the
discipline of Artificial Intelligence a truly organized attempt has been made to
build intelligent machines that model the mind. Many interesting programs have
been built, but the legitimacy of their success is a matter of great controversy.
None of the AI programs developed so far have come close to the true power
and intelligence of the brain. Expert systems, for example, are the most success
ful commercial AI programs, and even they have shown to be brittle, and only
able to deal with knowledge in very narrow domains.
I suggest that those interested in modeling the mind should
explore the emotions. I propose that intelligence and the emotions have a
dependent and critical relationship. This relationship suggests that attempts to
model human intelligence should consider how the emotions effect our thinking,
reasoning, problem-solving, and learning and incorporate this information into
computer models. This thesis will review what has been done in the field of AI
to build intelligent machines and will examine the relationship between emotions
and intelligence. A computer model of emotions will be presented: MS.
PACRAT - A Feeling Thinking Machine.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a result of their attempt to build intelligent machines, Artificial Intel
ligence researchers have opened up new avenues in the study of the nature
and subsistence of the mind. The comparison of the computer to the human
mind/brain had its beginnings, even before chips and neural networks. Tur
ing, the great contributor to the study of computing in the 1930's, pondered
and proposed answers to the study of the mind/brain question. Can a
mind/brain be programmed? Can a machine really think? Artificial intelli
gence has emerged to join in the attempt to answer these questions. Besides
AI there are actually a diversity of fields involved in this task. They include
psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, neuroscience, mathematics, and
computer science.
Even with all the impressive results so far in the field of AI, there have
been certain characteristics, or processes of human thinking that have not
been easily simulated using computers. These items may well contain the key
to how we make decisions, solve problems, and survive. These processes
include creativity, emotions, intuition, insight, introspection, and conscious
ness, among others. These processes certainly affect the way humans think,
and have withstood most (or all?) attempts to program them.
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As the main subject of this paper I will concentrate on one of these
processes, the emotions. I propose that intelligent behavior and the emotions
have a dependent, critical relationship and that this relationship should be
examined.
This thesis is divided into three main sections. Section 1 is the introduc
tion. Section 2 includes a critical history of the field of AI and its attempt to
produce intelligent machines. Section 3 discusses the relationship between
the emotions and intelligence. Section 4 presents MS. PACRAT, a computer
model of emotion.
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2. AI AND THE ATTEMPT TO BUILD INTELLIGENT MACHINES: A
CRITICAL HISTORY
Artificial Intelligence is the branch of computer science that is interested
in building machines that can do things that we consider to be intelligent.
This includes things such as; playing chess, recognizing a face, or making a
medical diagnosis. More specifically there seems to be two major goals in AI
research. The first is to write useful and interesting programs. This goal has
been fulfilled somewhat with the creation of expert systems that are used in
industry today. The second goal in AI is to gain an understanding of human
mental processes and attempt to simulate them with computer programs.
In this section I will discuss some of the relevant history in the field of
Artificial Intelligence in relation to these goals. I will discuss the research of
some interesting people including John McCarthy, the father of AI, Marvin
Minsky, and Terry Winograd. These men have made attempts to simulate
some of the processes of the mind through computer models. I will do this
by giving a short history of the work done in this area and by examining
specifically some models of mind relating to my thesis topic of emotions and
mental states in general. I will also discuss the attempts of those who have
chosen neural networks, as opposed to the more traditional programming of
AI - i.e., expert systems, rules, and logic programming - in their attempts to
model the mind. I will examine the successes and the failures of some of
Lorraine D'Ortona Masters Thesis
these attempts. To discuss this topic I will use my own variation of a frame
work presented by M. Mitchell Waldrop in his book Man-Made Minds.
The attempt to build intelligent machines and programs was at first
looked upon in a very optimistic manner. Many hopeful predictions were
made, some of which have been fulfilled, while the success of others is the
subject of much debate. Is it really possible for a machine to exhibit intelli
gent behavior? Is it important that the logistics of this behavior be exactly
the same as that of a human? Can only brains be intelligent? What is intel
ligence? These are some of the many questions that AI researchers have been
attempting to answer. One methodology chosen is to build computer models
of intelligent tasks. Paul Churchland, in Matter and Consciousness, writes:
One puzzling fact about the results of AI research is that there are
certain kinds of tasks such as number crunching, theorem proving,
and list searching, which standard computers do very swiftly and very
well, while the human brain does them only slowly and comparatively
badly. On the other hand there are certain kinds of tasks, such as
facial recognition, scene apprehension, sensorimotor coordination, and
learning which humans and other animals do swiftly and well, but
even the fastest computers running the most sophisticated programs
do only slowly and rather
poorly.1
2.1. PRE - PREHISTORY
The following is a discussion of ideas that pre-date the earliest com
puters. It was during this time that the basis for modern day computers
'Paul M. Churchland. Mutter and Contcioiuneti. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1984. p. 120.
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was thought about and put forth. Even during this period comparisons
were made between mechanical devices and the mind.
2.1.1. Blaise Pascal
During his life, from 1623 to 1662, Pascal designed a mechanical
calculator that could do the functions of addition and subtraction. This
work caused him to question the nature of human thinking. He
disagreed with the basic views of Descartes, that the mind is and should
be logical, and that the emotions are a negative force that interfere with
logic. Pascal believed that we must trust our intuitions and our emo
tions. He said, "The heart has its reasons that reason does not
know".2
2.1.2. Gottfried Leibniz
Leibniz, who lived from 1656 to 1716, is credited with building the
first calculating machine that could multiply and divide and with the
origination of the binary number system. He also pondered the nature
of the mind, but unlike Pascal, Leibniz claimed that thinking was a pro
cess that could be explicitly stated in rule-like form. He felt that
knowledge could somehow be formalized in a universal and exact system
of notation so that all concepts could be analyzed into a small number
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 3.
Lorraine D'Ortona Masters Thesis
6of original ideas. Leibniz felt that thought could be reduced to the
manipulation of numbers or computation.3
2.1.3. Babbage and the Analytical Engine
Babbage was an eccentric British mathematician who lived and
worked during the years 1791 - 1871. He devised the plans for two
machines: the Difference Engine, which was to be used for calculating
mathematical tables, and the Analytical Engine, a more general
machine that was to be used for a variety of mathematical tasks. These
models had many of the same characteristics of our computers today,
including a CPU, a memory, and programs that were represented as
holes on cards. Babbage, along with some of his colleagues, including
the famous Ada Lovelace, speculated on the question of machine intelli
gence. Lovelace in particular described a machine as only a symbol
manipulator possessing no originality or creativity, that could do only
what we tell it to do.4
2.1.4. George Boole
Boole was an English mathematician who lived during the mid
1800s. His contribution to the field of AI is the development of
"Hubert Dreyfus. What Computer! Can't Do. NY, NY: Harper and Row Pub., 1972. p. 69.
4Mike Sharpies. Computer! And Thought. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1989. p. 11.
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symbolic logic. Logic has been used in many AI programs, and as a
theory for how thinking and reasoning may take place in humans. It is
the basis for the programming language PROLOG. Boole thought that
reasoning could be calculating, and tried to "investigate the fundamen
tal laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning is per
formed, to give expression to them in the symbolic language of a Cal
culus....".5
2.1.5. Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell
In this same area there were also contributions by Bertrand Russell
and Alfred North Whitehead who wrote Principia Mathematica during
the years 1910 1913. They demonstrated that mathematics is founded
on logic and is, in fact, just another form of logic. It is interesting that
one
"successful" AI program, Logic Theorist, developed by Newell,
Simon, and Shaw, was able to prove theorems found in Whitehead and
Russell's work, and even found proofs that were considered much more
elegant than those that human minds had come up with.
'Hubert Dreyfus. What Computer! Can't Do. NY, NY: Harper and Row Pub., 1972. p. 70.
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2.2. PRE-HISTORY: 1930 - 1950
During the time of WWII the first computers were built. The U.S.
built machines that could calculate artillery tables. Great Britian created
computers with the ability to break German military codes. Germany put
their efforts towards machines that could calculate airplane wing flutter.
Immediately following this attempts were made to create intelligent pro
grams.6
2.2.1. Claude Shannon and Information Theory
Shannon was an engineering student at MIT. In 1937 he showed
that the operation of electrical relays and switching circuits could be
analyzed to yield such logical elements as True, False, And, Not, and
Or. In 1948 he developed what is known as Information Theory. This
theory proposed a mathematical definition for information. He believed
that the information content of a message was defined by the number of
symbols required to encode it, and not by what the message actually
said. There is debate about Shannon's theory concerning its relevance to
the semantics of a piece of information. In his famous work The
Mathematical Theory Of Communication , Shannon says:
The fundamental problem of communication is that of
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a
M.Mitchell Waldrop. Man-Made Mindi. USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 18.
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message selected at another point. Frequently the messages
have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according
to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities.
These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the
engineering
problem.7
Some, including Shannon, feel that it was wrong to consider Information
Theory a theory of meaning. Others, however, have attempted to use it
in this way and have proposed that it could explain how the brain
processes and understands information.
Shannon also started pondering the possibility of creating a chess
program in 1950. He did not develop a specific program, but considered
the issues and problems involved in programming an electronic com
puter to play a game of chess. Specifics of these ideas can be found in
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963). He estimated that in chess the
number of complete moves in an average length game is 10110. He wrote
articles on this subject and stated:
Investigating one particular line of play for 40 moves would be
as bad as investigating all lines for just two moves. A suitable
compromise would be to examine only the important possible
variations that is, forcing moves, captures and main threats
and carry out the investigation of the possible moves far enough
to make the consequences of each fairly clear. It is possible to
set up some rough criteria for selecting important variations,
not as efficiently as a chess master, but sufficiently well to
reduce the number of variations appreciably and thereby permit
a deeper investigation of the moves actually
considered.8
'Hubert Dreyfus. What Computer! Can't Do. NY, NY: Harper and Row Pub., 1972. p. 165.
Ibid. p. 74.
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In general, Shannon pondered the possibility of building intelligent
machines. He proposed that the tasks of pattern recognition and
language translation were probable for computers, but also suggested
that they may require a different type of computer than those that
existed during his lifetime. He says:
It is my feeling that this will be a computer whose natural
operation is in terms of patterns, concepts, and vague
similarities, rather than sequential operations and ten-digit
numbers.9
2.2.2. Alan Turing - The Grandfather Of AI
Ever since I learned about Alan Turing, his thoughts have always
been fascinating to me. During a time period when computers were in
their infancy Turing began to make predictions and ask questions such
as "Can machines think?" Really think? Can a machine be intelligent
and exhibit behavior that we would consider to be intelligent? To
answer these questions Turing proposed his famous "Imitation Game",
later known as the "Turing Test", in his 1950 article "Computing
Machinery and Intelligence". He says to imagine that you are alone in
a room with a teletype machine that is connected at the other end to
either a person or a computer. If through questioning and conversing
Hubert Dreyfus. What Computer! Can't Do. NY, NY: Harper and Row Pub., 1972. p. 304.
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with the "thing" on the other end, you cannot tell whether it is a com
puter or a person, then you have to concede that a machine can think.10
For simulation purposes, the dialogue of this machine would be made
flexible enough to allow it to be indistinguishable from that of a real
human. It would be able to answer questions concerning the "stuff of
the world", and even have the ability and sense to try to fool the player
of the game. To Turing, any machine that could do this would have to
be intelligent, and be able to think. It could also then be attributed
with having mental states and intentionality just like humans.
The validity of the Turing Test is still frequently discussed in
literature along with his famous question, Can machines think? It
seems that the most genuine answer may be, Who knows? This is
because we really do not understand what thinking is. Another
response may be, Who cares? If a machine can do a good job, does it
really matter? Some say, yes, machines can think, but they do not do it
the same way we do it. The most common answer though seems to be
that, no, machines do not think, and they never will. In Man-Made
Minds Waldrop writes:
Furthermore, the essence of humanity isn't reason, logic, or any
of the other things that computers can do; it's intuition,
sensuality, and emotion. How can a computer think if it does
not feel, and how can it feel if it knows nothing of love, anguish,
10M.Mitchell Waldrop. Man-Made Mindi. USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 16.
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exhilaration, loneliness, and all the rest of what it means to be a
living human being.11
I agree with Waldrop's comment, and that has led me to present this
thesis. Perhaps it is worth attempting to program a machine with these
things that Waldrop calls the "essence of humanity". The question,
however, of the plausibility of doing this, of course, still remains.
Another contribution of Turing is development of a hypothetical
logic machine in 1936, that could compute anything that could be com
puted. This meant that any logical reasoning process, no matter how
complicated, could be done on a real physical device. Turing called his
machine a universal machine, and explained that a digital computer is
one such machine. He wrote:
The special property of digital computers, that they can mimic
any discrete state machine, is described by saying that they are
universal machines. The existence of machines with this
property has the important consequence that, considerations of
speed apart, it is unnecessary to design various new machines to
do various computing processes. They can all be done with one
digital computer, suitably programmed for each case. It will be
seen that as a consequence of this all digital computers are in a
sense
equivalent.12
These ideas imply that any process that can be formalized and
represented as a series of steps can be reproduced by a machine. These
processes may also include certain kinds of thinking that could be done
"M.MitcheU Waldrop. Man-Made Mindi. USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 16.
"Hubert Dreyfus. What Computer! Can't Do. NY, NY: Harper and Row Pub., 1972. p. 72.
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without the use of the human brain.13 In Matter and Consciousness
Paul Churchland sums up this debate quite well. He writes:
The question that confronts the research program of AI,
therefore, is not whether suitably programmed computers can
simulate the continuing behavior produced by computational
procedures found in natural animals, including those found in
humans. That question is generally regarded as settled. In
principle, at least, they can. The important question is whether
the activities that constitute conscious intelligence are all
computational procedures of some kind or other. The guiding
assumption of AI is that they are, and its aim is to construct
actual programs that simulate them.14
2.2.3. Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts: the first Neural Nets
The foundations for connectionism were first laid by these two men
during the 1940s. They were the first to prove that some logical func
tions could be computed by networks of simple neurons. Neural nets
were designed by McCulloch and Pitts as blueprints for the special
senses (the senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell) as well as
the central processes of the human brain which involves the ability to
learn, think, and solve problems.
"M.MitcheU Waldrop. Man-Made Mind!. USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 16.
"Paul M. Churchland Matter and Coniciousnen. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1984. p. 105.
"Frank George AI It! PhXoiophy and Neural Content. NY, NY: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1986.
p. 31.
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2.2.4. Norbert Weiner and Cybernetics
Norbert Weiner was at MIT, and in 1948 published his theory of
Cybernetics. This theory has three main elements: the importance of
feedback for self-correction and the development of purpose, informa
tion theory, and the electronic computer. The idea of feedback can be
illustrated by a simple thermostat. It carries out the function of keep
ing a room at a certain temperature by constantly monitoring the
present state of the room. This information is fed back into the system,
and if any deviation in temperature is found, the thermostat corrects it
by turning a furnace on or off. The thermostat then has a goal, that of
keeping a room at a certain temperature, and so according to Weiner,
has a purpose.
2.2.5. John von Neumann
John von Neuman is credited with conceptualizing the computer in
its modern form during the 1940s. His model contained three parts: a
memory unit, a CPU, and a data channel connecting them. Von Neu
mann also originated the idea that a machine could treat both its data
and its programs in the same way. They could both be stored in
memory, and both be expressed in the same codes. This concept allowed
the possibility for a computer program to treat itself as data, and thus,
Lorraine D'Ortona Masters Thesis
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rewrite or correct itself. As we have seen today this idea has become a
reality, with AI programs that do have the ability to adjust themselves.
Von Neumann's computer is called a serial computer. It performs
its operations one at a time. He had hoped that the increasing speed
capacity of computers with time would make this drawback be insignifi
cant. One other problem with the architecture of the von Neumann
computer is its inefficient use of the CPU and memory. The CPU
spends time doing nothing while waiting for data and instructions to be
passed to and from memory and most memory cells are inactive most of
the time. These limits have forced researchers to look to alternatives. In
Man-Made Minds Waldrop explains:
But within a decade or so the von Neumann architecture is
going to be up against some severe limits. The very fastest
number-crunching computers, such as the Cray XM-P
(manufactured by Cray Research of Minneapolis), have already
begun to feel the constraints of relativity; electronic signals
can't travel faster than the speed of light, which means that at
some point it doesn't matter anymore how fast the individual
microcircuits are. Any gains made in one part of the computer
are eaten up by the delay in transmitting data to another part.
Nor does it help to put the chips closer together. Pack them too
densely and they begin to melt because there's no way to
dissipate the heat they generate.
In AI these limits are extremely serious. AI programs require immense
computing power, hence the interest in Connectionism and the scepti
cism towards traditional AI programs on serial computers. The nature
'"M.Mitchell Waldrop. Man-Made Mind*. USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 112.
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of the brain seems to be that of a parallel processor, requiring AI
researchers to reevaluate their needs. The field is attempting to model
the functions of this concurrent mechanism with its billions of proces
sors, using serial devices. According to Turing, this may be theoretically
possible, but what about the actuality of attempting to build real work
ing models?
2.2.6. Donald Hebb
Hebb was concerned with the nature of cognition and its neural
realization. During the decades of the 1940s he showed that neural net
works could exhibit the properties of learning and memory. He believed
that for a machine to support learning there had to be some kind of
physical change in the machine to represent the fact that learning had
taken place. This thought resulted in Hebb's rule which states that if
two units on each end of a connection were simultaneously activated,
then the connection between them would be strengthened. This rule
reflects the assumption that the more a connection is used, the easier it
IT
becomes to use it again.
Hebb suggested that memory may not be formed by individual
neurons each storing single concepts, but by patterns of
"Heini R. Pagels. The Dreamt OfBeaton. NY, NY: Bantam Books, 1989. p. 118.
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interconnections within groups of neurons. He called these "cell assem
blies"
or "phase sequences". Hebb hypothesised that learning occurs at
the synapses between nerve cells in one of these assemblies. He also sug
gested that these assemblies self-assembled during the maturation pro
cess of the organism.18
2.3. DAWN: 1950 - MLD 1960
It was during this period that the field of AI gained status as a legiti
mate field of study. The foundations were being laid for cognitive science,
and many AI labs were started. Mike Sharpies discusses this period in
Computers and Thought. He comments:
In the 1960s, general problem solving methods, supplemented by
domain specific heuristics, were applied to a wide range of
problems, and AI separated out into the application areas of
language understanding and generation, game playing, theorem
proving, vision, and robotics. With a few exceptions (such as
Newell and Simon's monumental work Human Problem Solving ,
1972) there was little attempt to construct programs that
accurately modeled the human mind; the emphasis was on
performance computer systems that acted in intelligent ways by,
for instance, playing chess or solving mathematical problems. The
general approach was one of successive refinement: start with a
method that approximates the desired action (e.g., a program that
plays chess badly, or solves puzzles in a large number of steps) and
then refine it until it behaves to the standard expected of an
intelligent human.19
"X. Nadel. Neural Connection!, Mental Computation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989. p. 1.
"Mike Sharpies. Computer! And Thought. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1989. p. 18.
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During this period work continued in the area of neural networks as a
means of reproducing human intelligence. Symbolic AI and neural net
works enjoyed equal footing in interest of research and in AI journals.
2.3.1. Arthur Samuel and His CHECKERS Program
Samuel actually began considering a checkers program as early as
1948. His first program was proposed in 1959. This model learned to
play the game of checkers. One remarkable thing about this program is
that it had the ability to improve its performance, and eventually was
able to beat its creator. Samuel's objective was to create a program
that learns. He chose the environment of the game of checkers in which
the learning process would take place. Samuel claims that checkers was
chosen because the simplicity of its rules permits greater emphasis to be
placed on learning techniques, and checkers contains all of the basic
characteristics of an intellectual activity in which heuristic procedures
and learning processes can play a major role and in which these
processes can be evaluated.
Samuel's program was given the basic rules for the game of check
ers, and a manner of accepting the opponent's moves and displaying his
"Edward Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman. Computert and Thought. NY, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1963. p. 72.
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own moves. He employed a standard depth first minmax search pro
cedure. The computer plays by looking ahead a few moves, and by
evaluating the resulting board positions which are scored. This scoring is
done in terms of a linear polynomial. In order to learn better moves,
the computer stores, based on score, certain board positions that can be
recalled for reference. Special mechanisms are set up to catalog boards
that are saved, delete redundancies, and to discard board positions
which are not believed to contain value. This method is called rote-
learning. A second method for learning that involves generalizations
was tried by Samuel. He attempted to give the program the ability to
generalize on the basis of past experience and to save only the generali
zations. "Samuel believes that the effective path to progress in AI is
probably not that of imitating and adapting human
processes."22 His
checkers program does not attempt to play using human-like reasoning.
Certainly a human checkers player does not base his move on a
mathematical evaluation. He may however look a few moves ahead, and
may also have memories of previous games and board positions to pull
from. In this sense, the procedure steps are similar, but the heuristics
are not. Samuel's program is considered with high regard in the AI field.
Programming specifics can be found in Samuel's article in Feigenbaum
"Edward Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman. Computert and Thought. NY, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1963. p. 80.
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(1963).
Checkers, however, did not escape criticism. Dreyfus maintains
that Checkers is not a champion and that his own creator admits
Checkers' limitation. Dreyfus writes, "According to Samuel, after
thirty-five years of effort, 'the program is quite capable of beating an
amateur player and can give better players a good contest'."23Dreyfus
contends that this is not such a spectacular record.
2.3.2. Frank Rosenblatt and the Perceptron
Rosenblatt extended the neural networks of McCulloch and Pitts
to create the "perceptron" in 1959. He built a seeing and learning
machine that eventually could recognize all 26 letters of the alphabet,
written in one specified format. Rosenblatt believed that humans were
born with a randomly connected network of neurons. Through learning,
this network becomes organized into a representation of the world.
Rosenblatt began a split in the AI community by stressing the
superiority of his perceptron and the inferiority of symbolic AI and its
techniques. He felt that the only way to recreate the intellectual powers
of the brain was to imitate the way the brain does it. Some in the AI
community, including Minsky, felt that it did not matter so much how
"Edward Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman. Computer! and Thought. NY, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1963. p. 38.
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY ,NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 107.
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the brain carries out its functions. To them, the important question was
to simulate what the brain did using whatever techniques were avail
able, even though they were totally foreign to the human brain.
2.3.3. JohnMcCarthy - The Father Of AI
John McCarthy was an assistant professor of mathematics at Dart
mouth college in 1956 when he organized the first conference to study
AI. This conference is considered the birthplace of AI and included such
participants as Newell, Simon, and Minsky. The purpose of this confer
ence was to gather all those involved in AI research to define the field
and gather direction for it. It was this conference and specifically
McCarthy that created the name of this new field: Artificial Intelli
gence. In 1957 McCarthy left Dartmouth and co-founded one of the
first AI labs at MIT. In 1962 he went to Stanford and set up another AI
lab. In 1958 McCarthy invented LISP, the most widely used AI
language.
2.3.4. Marvin Minsky
Minsky co-founded one of the first AI labs with McCarthy at MIT
in 1957. He was involved in the attempt to construct programs that
solve intelligent tasks. In 1961 he wrote an article on this subject titled,
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"Steps Towards AI". He discussed subjects such as search, pattern
recognition, learning, planning, and induction. Minsky writes,"To me
'intelligence'
seems to denote little more than the complex of perfor
mances which we happen to respect, but do not
understand."24
Minsky also argues that machines can think. He writes:
But we should not let our inability to discern a locus of
intelligence lead us to conclude that programmed computers
therefore cannot think. For it may be so with man, as with
machine, that, when we understand finally the structure and
the program, the feeling of mystery (and self-approbation) will
weaken.25
Another topic of interest that Minsky discussed is that an intelligent
machine would need not only an internal representation of the world,
but a representation of itself. He writes:
If one asks the creature, "Why did you decide to do such and
such?" (or if it asks this of itself), any answer might come from
an internal model. Thus the evidence of introspection itself is
liable to be based ultimately on the processes used in
constructing one's image of one's
self.2
2.3.5. Newell, Simon, and Shaw - Logic Theorist and GPS
Newell and Simon viewed the mind as a symbol-manipulating, or
information processing system. In 1955 they began working together at
"Edward,Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman. Computert and Thought. NY, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1963. p. 447.
"Ibid. p. 447.
"Ibid. p. 449.
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Carnegie Mellon to design a program that could exhibit intelligence.
Their first program was Logic Theorist which could prove mathematical
theorems in symbolic logic. Heuristic reasoning is the central strategy of
Logic Theorist. Newell and Simon rejected the idea of brute force to
solve a problem. They suggest that this is not the way humans do it.
We use rules of thumb, intuition, and hunches to solve problems.
Newell and Simon say that heuristics are very different from algorithms.
Heuristics, unlike algorithms, are not guaranteed to work. Their out
come is not predictable.
Simultaneously, Newell, Simon, and Shaw were already designing
an improved version of Logic Theorist, GPS (General Problem Solver).
It was intended to be a model of human thought processes. It was used
to solve problems in logic, as well as various games and puzzles. In 1972
they published Human Problem Solving , detailing their ideas about the
nature of the mind.
Newell and Simon intended their systems to solve problems in the
same way people do. They felt that heuristics were used by people, and
so could be used by machines. Simon said that some machines in
existence can literally think. Newell claimed that they had discovered
that the key to intelligence was found in physical symbol manipulation.
Many opposed this notion however, and GPS was criticized. Searle, in
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Mind's Brains and Science , discusses the question: Can a digital com
puter think? He explains:
This is to say: Is instantiating or implementing the right
computer program with the right inputs and outputs, sufficient
for, or constitutive of, thinking? And to this question, unlike its
predecessors, the answer is clearly 'no'. And it is
'no' for the
reason that we have spelled out, namely, the computer program
is defined purely syntactically. But thinking is more than just a
matter of manipulating meaningless symbols, it involves
meaningful semantic contents. These semantic contents are
what we mean by mental states, having a mind, all of these
simulations are really irrelevant. It doesn't matter how good the
technology is, or how rapid the calculations made by the
computer are. If it really is a computer, its operations have to
be defined syntactically, whereas consciousness, thought,
feelings, emotions, and all the rest involve more than a syntax.
Those features, by definition, the computer is unable to
duplicate however powerful may be its ability to simulate. The
key distinction here is between duplication and simulation. And
no simulation by itself ever constitutes duplication.27
Searle's famous Chinese Room argument also expresses this point.
Searle says that the person inside the room does not understand the
meaning of the symbols he is producing. He only knows syntax, not
semantics. He says that a manipulation of linguistic tokens is taking
place, rather than an understanding of how the symbols relate to real-
ity.28
"John Searle. Mindt, Braint and Science. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. p. 37.
"Nadel, Cooper, Cukover, and Harnish. Neural Connection!, Mental Computatiom. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1989. p. 292.
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2.3.6. Joseph Weizenbaum's ELIZA (1963)
Weizenbaum's natural language understanding program, ELIZA,
played the role of a non-directive therapist. The program used pattern
matching, searching and pre-defined responses to simulate natural
language understanding. Eliza was impressive to many people, resulting
in stories concerning people who, for brief periods, treated ELIZA as if
he (it) were a sympathetic human. Many people attributed human
characteristics to ELIZA.
Could ELIZA be considered intelligent? Could we say that ELIZA
can really understand English? Probably the biggest critic of ELIZA
was Weizenbaum himself. He believes that understanding comes about
only within a contextual framework: "In other words, we only under
stand what someone says to us because of what we have in common in
our understanding of the
world."29 He felt that ELIZA's representation
of knowledge was too shallow and inflexible to be intelligent.
2.4. DARK AGES: LATE 1960's
It was during this period that disillusionment set into the AI com
munity. Creating intelligence seemed to be much more difficult than was
first thought.
"Mike Sharpies. Computer! And Thought. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1989. p. 37.
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2.4.1. Minsky Again and Papert: The attack
Minsky and Papert contributed to a stagnation of neural network
research by discrediting much of the work done on Perceptrons during
the 1960s by claiming that the capabilities of the Perceptron had been
exaggerated. Their book, Perceptrons, proved that single-layered linear
systems could not compute certain important classes of functions. Their
efforts caused a suspending of funding of neural net work during the
1970s.
2.4.2. Feigenbaum and Buchanan Knowledge Engineering
In 1965, Feigenbaum and Buchanan founded the Stanford's Heuris
tic Programming Project. Their first effort was Dendral, which did
chemical analysis by interpreting the output of a mass spectrometer. It
was completed in the late 1960's. Dendral is considered to be the first
expert system.
Dreyfus contends that Dendral is actually not that successful. He
claims to have contacted universities and industrial sites and found that
Dendral is not widely used commercially.
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 110.
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2.S. RENAISSANCE: 1970s
It was during this period that an emphasis on real-world applications
dominated AI. A new concept for investigation emerged. It was speculated
that the fundamental ingredient of intelligence was knowledge. Many ques
tions were asked such as: What is knowledge? How can knowledge be
represented in a machine? And, Can a computer learn? Expert systems,
vision, and natural language understanding programs flourished.
Dreyfus (1986) discusses two types of knowledge held by experts.
The first type is the facts of the domain of the expert. This he describes as
widely shared knowledge that is written in the textbooks and journals of
the field. The second type of knowledge is heuristic knowledge. Dreyfus
describes this as knowledge of good practice and good judgement in a field.
It is experiential knowledge, the "art of good guessing", that a human
expert acquires over years of work.
The use of production systems became a popular technique during
this period. A production system uses condition action pairs called produc
tion rules. A production rule is in the form: if this condition holds (or is
true), then a certain action is carried out. The left part of the rule states
the conditions that must be true before the right side or action part can be
executed. During execution, the program searches the left side for a match,
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY ,NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 104.
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and when one is found, the right side "fires". One advantage of production
systems is that rules can be added, deleted, or modified, very easily.
2.5.1. PROSPECTOR
PROSPECTOR was designed to advise geologists on whether or
not a given site might have ore-grade deposits. It was developed at SRI
international, a nonprofit research group in Menlo Park, California.
Dreyfus maintains that the success of PROSPECTOR is exag
gerated. He claims that there is no proof that PROSPECTOR has out
performed human experts in the field.32 It is also suggested that
PROSPECTOR'S knowledge is artificial in the sense that it knows rules
for how to identify various kinds of geological formations, but it has no
idea what sedimentation, metamorphism, or vulcanism
were.33
2.5.2. HEARSAY H
This is a Speech recognition system designed at Carnegie-Mellon
by Newell and Simon's group. It is widely considered to be one of the
most influential AI programs ever
written.34The importance of HEAR-
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 115.
"Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett. The Mind'i I. NY, NY: Basic Books Inc., 1981. p. 19.
"Ibid. p. 132.
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SAY lies not in how well the system understands speech, but in the way
that it is constructed the idea of independent knowledge sources
cooperatively solving a problem by posting hypotheses on a global
blackboard data structure.35 HEARSAY was programmed to play voice
chess and it was the first system to recognize non-trivial connected
speech.
2.5.3. MYCIN, PUFF, LNTERNIST-1, GULDION, CADEUS, and
RECONSIDER
These are all expert systems relating to the medical field. They are
based on heuristic rules extracted from experts. Cadeus was begun in
the early 70s as Internist, a specialist in internal medicine. Mycin can
diagnose infectious diseases. PUFF can diagnose lung disease.
RECONSIDER is a diagnostic prompting system that works by
encouraging doctors to consider alternatives and not jump to conclu
sions. GULDION is an expert system developed as a teaching system
for doctors.
The performance of MYCIN and LNTERNIST-1 have been com
pared to that of human doctors. An evaluation of MYCIN was
presented in the article "Antimicrobial Selection by a Computer". This
"Avron Barr and Edward Feigenbaum. The Handbook Of Artificial Intelligence. Reading, Mass: Addison-
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article was published in the Journal Of the American Medical Associa
tion in 1979. MYCIN was given information concerning ten meningitis
cases and asked to prescribe drug therapy. Its prescriptions were
evaluated by a panel of eight infectious disease specialists. The experts
rated as acceptable seventy percent of MYCIN'S
therapies.36
INTERNIST'S evaluation was published in the 1982 New England
Journal of Medicine in an article entitled, "LNTERNIST-1, an Experi
mental Computer Based Diagnostic Consultant for General Internal
Medicine". INTERNIST was given nineteen cases to diagnose, each of
which had several diseases, so that there were 43 diagnoses to make in
total. LNTERNIST's diagnoses were compared to that of clinicians at
Massachusettes General Hospital and with case discussants. The result:
Of the 43, INTERNIST missed 18, the clinicians missed 15, and the
case discussants missed 8. The evaluation of INTERNIST was not very
encouraging, It was concluded that the experienced clinician was vastly
superior to
LNTERNIST-1.37 Dreyfus discusses the idea that these medi
cal expert systems in particular have merit if they are used along with a
doctor, instead of in place of a doctor.
Wesley Pub. Co., 1981. p. 343.
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 116.
"Ibid. p. 116.
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2.5.4. Terry Winograd and SHRDLU (1973)
SHRDLU was design by Winograd as a simulation of a robot's arm
that could recognize and move a set of blocks. SHRDLU also is able to
communicate about his (its) blocks world using natural language.
SHRDLU's knowledge is represented in the form of procedures rules
that can move blocks, stack blocks, and perform other operations in his
(its) environment.
The major problem raised by critics of SHRDLU concerns his (its)
world. He operates in a very narrow domain called a micro-world. A
micro-world is a very thin slice of the world we live in. Dreyfus
discusses this failure in his book Mind Over Machine. He quotes Wino
grad:
The AI programs of the late 60's and early seventies are much too
literal. They deal with meaning as if it were a structure to be built
up of the bricks and mortar provided by the words. ...This gives them
a brittle character, able to deal well with tightly specified areas of
meaning in an artificially formal conversation. They are
correspondingly weak in dealing with natural utterances, full of bits
and fragments, continual (unnoticed) metaphor, and reference to
much less easily formalizable areas of
knowledge.38
Attempts to generalize the knowledge of SHRDLU were not very
successful. SHRDLU's confinement to a micro-world gives him (it) no
frame of reference to the outside world. He (it) does not know who he
(it) is or where he (it) fits in the world. His (it's) world is separate and
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 77.
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isolated from human life. His (it's) memory is limited and his (it's) arbi
trary acquisition and representation of knowledge is artificial.
2.5.5. Colby's PARRY
PARRY is a model of a patient suffering from paranoia. He con
versed in a manner that a paranoid would. His creator, Kenneth Colby,
claimed that PARRY was a true model of mind. Critics would of course
challenge this. Colby claims that Parry passed two different versions of
the Turing Test. The first test involved showing transcripts of PARRY
conversations to experts. Weizenbaum, the creator of ELIZA, refuted
these claims. "Weizenbaum claimed that by Colby's reasoning, any elec
tric typewriter is a good model of infantile autism: type in a question
and it just sits there and hums. No experts on autism could tell tran
scripts of genuine attempts to communicate with autistic children from
such futile typing
exercises!"39
In The Mind's Eye, Douglas Hofstadter discusses Parry's limita
tions.
SANDY:
An interesting thing about Parry is that it creates no sentences on its
own it merely selects from a huge repertoire of canned sentences
the one that best responds to the input sentence.
"Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett. The Mind'i I. NY, NY: Basic Books Inc., 1981. p. 469.
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PAT:
Amazing! But that would be impossible on a larger scale, wouldn't it?
SANDY:
Yes. The number of sentences you'd need to store to be able to
respond in a normal way to all possible sentences in a conversation is
astronomical, really unimaginable. And they would have to be so
intricately indexed for retrieval.40
2.5.6. Minsky Again Frames
Frames were originally proposed by Minsky (1975) for representing
knowledge. They are based on the fact that when we recall the image of
a particular object, we recall a group of typical attributes of that object.
Minsky attempted to combine these attributes into a frame. For exam
ple, take the word chair. Minsky says that a chair frame would include
certain expectations about chairs that we have in our minds. This
includes things such as: chairs have four legs, a seat, a back, and two
arms. You also expect that a chair would probably be used for sitting.
All of this information would be contained in the frame.
There do exist some legitimate problems with frames. Referring to
the above example, you can imagine a chair that does not have arms or
legs. Think about a bean bag chair. Unfortunately there are always
exceptions and special cases of every description of an object. This same
criticism is raised in reference to rule-based systems. Even Minsky raises
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this problem by suggesting that the rule: "All birds can fly" requires
commonsense knowledge to be truly understood. A bird cannot fly if it
is a penguin, or is dead, or has a broken wing, or is in a cage. How can
these exceptions to the rule be explicitly stated so that a true picture of
a bird can emerge?41
2.5.7. Roger Shank: Scripts, CYRUS, and FRUMP
At Yale University, Roger Schank and Robert Abelson were study
ing natural language understanding. They developed two programs,
FRUMP and CYRUS. FRUMP stands for "Fast Reading, Understand
ing, and Memory Program". It can read and paraphrase news stories
from United Press International wire service, indicating that it had
understood the subject manner. CYRUS, or Computerized Yale Reason
ing and Understanding System, had the job of monitoring all stories
about Cyrus Vance, then secretary of state, and compile all facts found.
Shank wrote,
This was an attempt to begin to model the memory of a particular
individual. In some sense, the program thought of itself as Cyrus
Vance. When asked, during a dialogue about the Camp David
negotiations, "Has your wife ever met Mrs.
Begin?" CYRUS
answered, "Yes, most recently at a state dinner in Israel in January
1980." The program actually had no specific information in its
memory about the wives of Vance and former Israeli prime minister
"Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett. The Mind'i I. NY, NY: Basic Books Inc., 1981. p. 60.
41M.Mitchell Waldrop. Man-Made Mind: USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 48.
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Menachem Begin. It was guessing. It figured that if it could find a
situation when both women were likely to be present, then it could
assume that they had met, Shank explained. The program thus
searched for social situations Finding a state dinner in Israel that
occurred during a trip where Mrs. Vance (accompanied) her
husband, it assumed the rest.42
Another important contribution by Schank was the development of
a theory of knowledge representation called Conceptual Dependency
theory. Scripts were part of this theory. A script is composed of a series
of scenes that represent the sequence of events we expect to encounter
in a given situation. An example can be shown using a restaurant script.
When you go into a restaurant you expect to see certain props such as
tables, chairs, menus, plates, utensils, and food. You also expect to see
certain people in certain roles: manager, waitress, and hostess. It is also
assumed that when you go into a restaurant you are hungry, you have
money, you will eat, and then you will have less money. The script will
contain this information along with certain actions that could take place
within this scene. These actions may include: enter the restaurant, look
for a table, go to the table, decide where to sit at the table, and sit
down.
"George Johnson. Machinery Of The Mind. Redmond, Washington: Microsoft Press, 1986. p. 171.
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2.5.8. Ross Quillian and Semantic Nets
Quillian developed the concept of Semantic Networks intending
them to be a psychological model of associative memory. These nets
consist of nodes that represent objects, concepts, or situations in a
domain, and arcs that connect the nodes, representing the relationships
between them. For example, a net may include the statement, robin is-a
bird., where robin and bird are nodes, and is-a is an arc. One advantage
to this approach is that it is easy to add new nodes (For example, Clyde
is-a robin is-a bird), so that deductions can be easily made concerning
inheritance hierarchies.
2.5.9. Doug Lenat: Automated Mathematics (AM)
AM is a program that could learn. Lenat gave AM basic
mathematical information such as how to determine whether two sets
are equal and how to perform the inverse of a mathematical function.
AM used this information to formulate new theorems and concepts in
mathematics. It reportedly reproduced many mathematical theories,
and also came up with a new theory concerning prime numbers.
Dreyfus contends that even Lenat admits that AM's abilities were
a result of the special properties of the language LISP, used to program
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2.6. NEW AGE: 1980s - CONNECTIONISM and NEURAL NETWORKS
The most important aspect of this period in AI and its attempt to
build intelligent machines is the resurgence of work done in the area of
neural networks. Researchers were becoming more and more aware of the
shortcomings of traditional AI and its rule-based logic systems. Many
started to believe that traditional AI using production rules, predicate cal
culus, frames, or scripts, was on the wrong path. Connectionism, the
attempt to model the mind in terms of biological plausibility, was reborn.
Neural Networks and Traditional AI are very different. Traditional AI
programs use rules that operate on symbols based on syntax. Neural Nets
do not use explicit rules. They are concerned with individual processing
units that are defined in terms of activation thresholds and synaptic
weights. To overcome the criticisms of the past, neural network research
ers added a hidden layer to the net. In the connectionist model, knowledge
is distributed across many processing elements.
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 213.
"Nadel, Cooper, Cukover, and Harnish. Neural Connection!, Mental Computation!. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1989. p. 2
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2.6.1. Past Tense Of English Verbs: Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams
Influential to this period was the publishing in 1986 of Parallel Dis
tributed Processing by McClelland and Rumelhart. Their idea is to pro
gram neuron-like networks that are inspired by the brain, but do not
imitate it exactly. The emphasis is on the parallel processing of such a
network, which would be much faster than traditional serial processing.
Rumelhart, along with Hinton and Williams, also developed a new
program. This neural net learned to conjugate English verbs. It did not
contain explicit rules as in a traditional AI program. Interestingly
enough the net's mistakes were very similar to those seen in children
during their learning of the past tenses of English verbs.
2.6.2. R. Pfeifer and D. Nicholas: A Model of Anger
This model is one of the few I have found besides Pacrat that deals
specifically with emotions. This model of anger was carried out at Car
negie Mellon. The main goal of the project was to construct a computa
tional model of emotions, representing how and when emotions are pro
duced. This was done based on the theory that motive and emotion are
major influences on cognitive behavior. Mandler (1975) influenced this
research through his idea of the role of interrupts in emotion generation.
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He argued that an increase in arousal follows the interruption of organ
ized behavior. He believes that interrupts are crucial in multiple task
environments where the real time information processing demands of an
organism may be considerable. The interrupt facilitates the refocusing of
attention, a necessity for survival of an organism.45 The degree to which
arousal increases after an interrupt seems to depend on two factors:
surprise and importance. The more surprising and/or important the
interrupt is, the larger the resulting increase in arousal will be. Also
addressed in this project is the idea that previously generated emotions
can be recalled along with the events that elicited them.
This model is designed as a production system and uses a semantic
network for representing declarative knowledge. Procedural knowledge
is encoded in the form of production rules. These rules have an "if
then"
structure with a set of conditions that match against the contents
of working memory, followed by a set of actions to be executed, if the
conditions have been satisfied. A typical action might involve working
memory, long term memory, and a separate processing system that
corresponds to the Central Nervous System.
The researchers describe three situations when emotions are gen
erated in an organism: l)when a well organized sequence or sub-
"L.Steel and J.A.CampbeU. Progrett In AI. West Sussex, England: Ellis Norwood Pub, 1985. p. 185.
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sequence of behaviors has been completed, 2)When an interrupt occurs
in such a sequence, and 3)as a result of explicit deliberation (for exam
ple, in the intentional recall of some past event that has emotional signi
ficance). Also presented are three classes of interrupts: l)those trig
gered by a stimulus in the environment such as a loud noise, 2)those
triggered by physiological signals like hunger or pain, and 3)those trig
gered by the operation of information processing.4
To illustrate the emotion generation process an example is given in
which an interrupt has occurred while the system is executing a com
mand. The goal is to attend an important meeting in another city. In
order to do so, the person must catch a plane leaving an airport in a few
minutes. In order to catch the plain the person gets a taxi. While
enroute to the airport, the taxi develops a flat tire. This generates an
interrupt, and a link to the event that caused the interrupt is esta
blished in working memory. To calculate the increased arousal, which
theoretically follows an interrupt, values representing surprise and
importance are calculated using a mathematical formula.
At this point a set of production rules is invoked to determine the
quality of the emotion to be generated. An example rule is:
"L.Steel and J.A.Campbell. Progrett In AI. West Sussex, England: Ellis Norwood Pub, 1985. p. 186.
"Ibid. p. 186.
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Rl:LF state is negative for self
& state was caused by person1
& personl was in control
& emotional target is personl
THEN generate anger at personl
A production rule such as this can only apply when all of its conditions
match against events in working memory so that in order to fire Rl, a
number of sub-rules will have to apply first. Two examples of these are:
R2:LF an interrupt has occurred
& emotion is to be determined
THEN determine target for emotion.
R3:LF an interrupt has occurred
& emotion is to be determined
THEN determine if current state is negative for
self.48
When all of its conditions are present in working memory, Rl is
applied, and its actions result in the addition of several structures to
working memory. The intensity of the emotion is also calculated using a
formula. Long term memory is now updated by adding to it the ele
ments currently in working memory.
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Some rules in this emotional model are less general than Rl, R2,
and R3. Two examples of these are:
R4:LF my son kicks the cat
THEN generate anger at my son.
R5:LF self sees an event that may be described by the
expression "bully hurts victim"
& the emotional target is bully
THEN generate anger at bully.49
The researchers feel that their model has room for expansion.
They believe that the model needs more knowledge of the world and
better inference processes.
2.6.3. ART: Automated Reasoning Tool
This program was a creation of the Inference Corporation in 1984.
It could write its own computer programs, and also assist human pro
grammers with their writing. ART is known as a "knowledge-
engineering
environment"
or "software-development toolkit" an aid
"L.Steel and J.A.Campbell. Progreu In AI. West Sussex, England: Ellis Norwood Pub, 1985. p. 188.
"Ibid. p. 189.
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to designing expert systems.50
2.6.4. Common Sense: Cyc by Doug Lenat
Cyc is an attempt to give a program common sense knowledge.
Now in its sixth year of development, Lenat claims that Cyc has the
abilities of a 4 year old child. Lenat and other researchers have been
feeding knowledge about the world to Cyc from newspapers and maga
zines. This information is stored in a frame-like construction. Cyc was
given information about the world and about himself. He then medi
tates over this information and looks for redundancies or contradictions.
Lenat hopes that Cyc will someday be able to read different publica
tions himself, instead of having knowledge force fed to him by research
ers.
One interesting story concerning Cyc relates to his understanding
of the concept of "intelligent things". Cyc once asked, "All the others
who work on this project are people. Am I a
person?" Doug
responded,"No."Cyc responds, "Is anyone else who works on this pro
ject a computer program? Are you a computer
program?" Doug
responds,
"No."51
"George Johnson. Machinery Of The Mind. Redmond, Washington: Microsoft Press, 1986. p. 11.
"David H. Freedman. "Common Sense and the Computer" In Diteover Magazine. Volume 11. Number 8.
March 1991. p. 71.
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Cyc was built in response to the problem of commonsense reason
ing in AI. Dreyfus discusses this extensively in his book Mind over
Machine. He quotes Minsky:
Just constructing a knowledge base is a major intellectual research
problem.. ..We still know far too little about the contents and
structure of commonsense knowledge. A "minimal" commonsense
system must
"know"
something about cause and effect, time,
purpose, locality, process, and types of knowledge. We need a serious
epistemological research effort in this area.52
Lenat, of course, claims that he is making progress in this area. Others
are sceptical. Even Minsky has criticized Cyc based on the fact that he
uses only one method for representing knowledge, the frame. Minsky
says that the systems of the future will have two or three different ways
of representing knowledge with cross links between them. In a sense,
Cyc has what SHRDLU lacked, a sense of who he is and a knowledge of
the world we live in. Lenat sees Cyc someday used for many things: in
schools for one-on-one tutoring, in retail stores as a database to custom
design products for individual consumers, as a scientist making
discoveries, and even as a marriage counselor.
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 140.
"David H. Freedman. "Common Sense and the Computer". In Diteover Magazine. Volume 11. Number 8.
March 1991. p. 70.
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2.6.5. Rosenburg and Sejnowski - NETtalk
This neural network could read printed text and repeat it verbally.
It learns to transform letters into certain sounds. At first the program
does not perform well. Through successive iterations its performance
improves. After ten hours of training on 1000 words, it produced
coherent, intelligible speech given arbitrary English
text.54 The interest
ing thing about NETtalk, and neural nets in general, is that unlike trad
itional AI programs they do not require the use of specific rules for
representing knowledge. However, these systems need an initial training
process so that the program can learn its function.
2.7. THE 1990s
2.7.1. Attila the Robot
Attila was created by Rodney Brooks at MIT. He weighs 3.6
pounds has 10 microprocessors and 150 sensors. He has six legs and
looks similar to a spider or insect. Because of his six-legged architecture
he can move throughout a hostile environment quite well. He can climb
over obstacles, pull himself onto ledges, and crawl up near vertical
inclines. Brooks's Attila is not programmed in the same sense of
"Paul M. Churchland Matter and Comciouinen. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1984. p. 163.
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traditional AI. He does not claim that Attila thinks the way we do or
does anything the way we do.
In Brook's model there are basic procedures that are like primitive
instincts. These include things such as Move Forward, or Track Prey.
There is not one separate brain that processes everything; instead each
procedure acts as a separate unit that competes for control. The winner
is chosen based on sensory input. Attila has no representation of him
self or his world. He can move around in his world, but he does not
have any higher level functions such as recognition, reasoning, or think
ing.
Marvin Minsky has criticized this approach because of this reason.
He says, "Why bother building a robot that's capable of getting from
here to there, if once it gets there it can't tell the difference between a
table and a cup of
coffee?"55Brooks says that he doesn't care if his
robots are dumb. They are easy and cheap to build and do not require
a lot of computing power to run. His goals for his robot are many. A
miniature version could be used to clean carpets. A group of them could
be used to construct objects. He would also like to see them travel the
surfaces of the moon or Mars.
"David H. Freedman. "Invasion of the Insect
Robots." In Diteover Magazine. Volume 12. Number 8. August
1990. p. 46.
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An interesting addition to Attila is being worked on by one of
Brook's associates, Pattie Maes. Her specialty is the creation of pro
grams that learn from their mistakes and modify themselves. She is
attempting to give Attila motivations for his actions. These would
include aggression, hunger, and curiosity. This would give Attila a per
sonality.
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3. EMOTIONS AND INTELLIGENCE
As we have just seen in the previous section, the field of AI is attempt
ing to build intelligent, thinking machines. Human beings have this ability.
We can think and reason. The ability to think and reason allows us to solve
problems and to make decisions. This is intelligent behavior. The human
brain, for this reason, is used in AI as a model for creating intelligent pro
grams.
Human thought processes have some unique influences or co-processes
associated with them. For example, there is certainly something special
about the power of intuition or insight, and I don't think that anyone would
be opposed to programming them into machines if it were possible. They
contribute to doing things that we consider intelligent such as; solving a prob
lem, writing a computer program, or planning our daily schedule of activities.
Creativity is an example of another co-process that contributes to thinking
with intelligence. Creativity produces new ideas, which is essential to any
intelligent task.
If we take the approach of using the brain as a model of an intelligent
machine, then perhaps we should determine the nature of these influences,
and if, and how, they can be incorporated into computer models of the
human brain. Within AI research there have been few models that have
attempted this. There does exist however, is a generous amount of literature
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about the nature of human thought processes including these co-processes.
Another influence on intelligent behavior that should be explored is the
emotions. Humans are emotional beings. Our emotions are constantly present
unless consciously repressed, something which is not always an easy task. In
this thesis, I am suggesting that one of the missing components to building
intelligent machines may be the emotions. In the first part of this section I
will present evidence from psychological literature to substantiate my
hypothesis regarding the relationship between the emotions and cognition or
intellectual behavior. I am suggesting that emotions, like creativity, insight,
and intuition may be necessary for true intelligence. What is needed then is
an examination of this relationship and an investigation into the true nature
of emotions. What functions do the emotions serve in a human being's life?
Are these functions learned, innate, or both? The emotions seem to be able to
get us to do things. How does this motivational mechanism work? What type
of survival benefits are built in to the emotions? How do the emotions relate
and react with perception? How do the emotions affect cognition? Can the
emotions improve or degrade performance in intelligent tasks? These ques
tions will be explored within the framework of psychological literature.
In the second part of this section I will discuss the ideas of Marvin Min
sky concerning the relationship between intelligence and the emotions. He
examines this relationship from the perspective of a mathematician, computer
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scientist, and philosopher. He believes that the emotions and intelligence are
intertwined.
3.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMOTIONS
The topic of emotions in psychological literature is both varied in
opinion and theory, and also somewhat neglected. To some, the concept of
emotions is not eligible for a truly serious discussion or analysis. It is
somehow irrational and not clearly defined. Those who have attempted to
study emotions have proposed very diverse and interesting theories. There
is not even agreement in this area of study about the definition of emo
tions or even a categorical list of emotions. From the research I have done,
it seems that the emotions are not simple phenomena. In this paper I will
discuss some of the theories that I feel are the most important and stimu
lating.
I will begin with a more general discussion first. There does seem to
be some main commonalities among the diverse theories of emotions. The
following list contains what seem to be the main components of many of
the theories I have studied:
(1) Emotions may or may not entail some type of cognitive appraisal of
something being in some way desirable or undesirable. This appraisal
need not take place consciously in the individual.
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(2) Emotions seem to contain a certain subjective, felt quality that is
present in consciousness and available for study only through intros
pection.
(3) Emotions occur usually along with marked bodily sensations of certain
kinds.
(4) Emotions also occur along with certain involuntary body processes
and overt expressions of certain kinds, such as facial expressions.
(5) Tendencies to act in certain ways seem to be included in emotional
responses.
(6) An upset or disturbed condition of body and mind seems to occur
along with emotions. This condition can be seen as disruptive or
organizing, depending on the situation.
(7) Emotions seem to play a role in learning.
(8) Emotions may have an effect on memory.
(9) Emotions may have survival benefits for an individual and a
species.56
Theories of emotions differ as to which of these items they take to be
the emotion itself and which they take to be causes or effects of the emo
tions. Some theories have a proposed time order for some of the points
listed above. Other theories stress the importance of only some of the
"Alston William. "Emotion and Feeling" Encyclopedia Of PhUonphy Vol. p. 479-486.
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points, while not even addressing others.
3.1.1. Two Prominent Theories
Probably the two most notable theories of emotions are the
James-Lange Theory and the Cannon Theory. The James-Lange theory
was developed by William James in 1884 and Carl Lange independently
in 1885. This theory states that bodily changes precede the feeling of
emotion and that it is the perception of these bodily changes that is the
emotional experience. To James and Lange, an emotional stimulus
immediately causes us to respond with muscular and glandular reactions
that characterize the emotion and the situation. Feedback from these
emotional responses arrives at the cortex, and then we feel the emotion.
Emotions, then, arise from sensations in the body's muscles and comes
after a state of bodily arousal, and not before it. James and Lange
emphasize the role of the autonomic nervous system in the expression of
emotions. Crucial to this is the view that autonomic changes are com
municated to the central nervous system which experiences these
changes as specific emotions.
An experiment by W. B. Cannon using dogs produced a criticism
of the James-Lange theory, resulting in a new theory of emotions. Can
non severed the connections between the autonomic nervous system and
the central nervous system and found that dogs continued to express
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emotional states. Cannon's main hypothesis is that the physiological
state and the emotional experience are triggered simultaneously by the
hypothalamus. This proposes a different time order for the emotional
experience and the bodily response. Cannon's theory is a physiological
theory that suggests how the functions of certain brain structures may
determine emotional states. To Cannon, visceral changes cannot be dis
tinguished from emotions. These changes are also too slow to be a
source of emotional feeling.
3.1.2. Other Theories
3.1.2.1. Sigmund Freud
To Freud, our adult life is mainly a function of our early infan
tile development. Freud uses the terrninology of arousal or cathexis
when referring to emotions. This arousal is associated with three
main systems: the oral or alimentary, the anal or eliminative, and the
genital or sexual. Freud says that various aspects of these activities
can be pleasant or unpleasant depending on the interpretation of the
event in the context of our environment. He explains that we
attempt to find states of environment that will result in pleasant
experiences. He claims that this is how we learn about which events
in life will lead to positive outcomes. This theme is definitely present
in other psychological literature. Pain and pleasure are strong
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motivating factors in our lives. They can facilitate learning and influ
ence our actions.
It is difficult to present a consistent treatment of affect in
terms of classical psychoanalytic theory since Freud and his
followers used the term rather loosely and prescribed
different roles for it as the theory developed. In his early
work Freud thought affect or emotion was the only driving
force in mental life, and at various times in his later writings
he still spoke of affect or emotions as the intrapsychic factors
which give rise to fantasies, wishes, and symptoms.57
Freudian theory in general is primarily concerned with the nega
tive affects arising from conflict, which then result in repression as a
defense mechanism. This is related to Freud's idea of discharge. It
is when this discharge is not allowed to take place properly that
problems with our psyche can occur. This point is related to Freud's
view on the evolutionary aspects of emotions, and his claim that
humans have an innate drive towards aggression that serves the sur
vival of both the individual and the species. According to Freud
when this aggression cannot be expressed, it becomes dammed up
and as a consequence, it is often inappropriately
released.58 To
Freud, our emotions are instinctual, and serve the purpose of
motivating our actions. It was work by Freud that opened up the
field of motivation to psychology.
"Carroll E. Izard Human Emotiom. NY, NY: Plenum Press, 1977. p. 21.
"George Mandler Mind And Emotion. NY, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1975 p. 143.
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Freud also recognized the importance of the arousal of the auto
nomic nervous system and an interpretation of the environment. He
therefore stressed the importance of a cognitive appraisal of the
situation and some type of automatic bodily response.
3.1.2.2. Charles Darwin
Darwin's theory of natural selection implies that almost every
feature of each existing species has survival value, including emo
tional behavior. The emotions of fear and aggression (anger) to
Darwin perform the function of promoting survival. Aggression, for
example, facilitates the selection of the strongest animals of a given
species. Fear also does this by serving as a warning signal to danger,
providing rapid response, e.g., avoidance. Darwin also raises the
importance of evaluation and emotions. He explains that an organism
must recognize the beneficial or harmful aspects of its environment in
order to survive. Emotions often accomplish this task. To Darwin,
the fundamental emotions are governed by innate neural programs.
This does not mean that no aspect of an emotion can be modified
through experience. He says that people can learn to modify these
innate emotional responses.
In Darwin's famous work, The Expression Of The Emotions In
Man And Animals, he explains that there are some universal,
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unlearned, cross cultural, emotional expressions, primarily facial in
nature. He discusses the fact that certain emotions have the same
expressions and experiential qualities in widely different cultures
from virtually every continent of the globe, including isolated preli-
terate cultures, who have had virtually no contact with western civil
ization. This expressive behavior can either be a consequence of
emotions or a regulator of emotions. Regarding regulation, Darwin
expressed the opinion that facial expressions, or other outward signs
of an emotion can intensify the emotion, and that, in the reverse, the
repression of all outward signs of an emotion can soften or repress it.
To Darwin, these facial expressions resulted from the evolutionary
process.
3.1.2.3. S. S. Tomkins
According to Tomkins, emotions constitute the primary motiva
tional system of human beings. They play an important role in
organizing and sustaining behavior. Tomkins stresses the importance
of perception and cognition in initiating emotions, but also
emphasizes a two-way interaction between cognition and emotions
and the important effects that emotion can have on perception and
cognition. He says, "Reason without emotion would be impotent,
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emotion without reason would be blind".60 To Tomkins, the intimate
relationship between affect and cognition is rooted in the infant's
early efforts at adjustment to its new and ever changing environ
ment. He explains that this environmental novelty activates the
interest affect which in turn sustains efforts of exploration. Thus,
affective and cognitive processes are intertwined from the very begin
ning of life.
Tomkins also looked at emotions from the neurological level. He
maintained that emotions are activated by changes in the density of
neural stimulation. He defined this as the number of neurons firing
per unit of time. Tomkins states that changes in neural stimulation,
and hence activation of an emotion, can occur as a result of an innate
releaser, a drive state, an image, or another emotion. He said that
any of these could activate an emotion without an appraisal process.
Tomkins says that emotions can be unlearned and that the emotional
system is also capable of being instigated by learned stimuli. He also
maintains that some emotions are consistently elicited by stimulation
increase, some by stimulation decrease, and some by the mainte
nance of a steady level of stimulation.
"Carroll E. Izard Human Emotiom. NY, NY: Plenum Press, 1977. p. 6.
"Ibid. p. 51.
Lorraine D'Ortona Masters Thesis
58
Tomkins also noticed the special significance of the face, facial
expressions, and facial feedback. He says that feedback from facial
behavior, when transformed into conscious form, constitutes the
experience or awareness of emotion. He also explains that specific
innate programs for organized sets of facial responses are stored in
sub-cortical centers. According to Tomkins, visceral responses play a
secondary role in emotion, providing only background or accompani
ment for the discrete expressions of the face. A specific emotion, a
specific facial expression, and our awareness of that facial expression
comprise the innately programmed subjective experience of emotion.
Tomkins developed a detailed method for measuring facial behavior
called FAST (Facial Affect Scoring Test). It explores the expressions
of the brow and forehead, the eye-lids, and the lower face including
the cheeks, nose, mouth, and chin.
Tomkins also stresses the importance of the emotion of interest.
He says that the emotion of interest is as essential to intellectual
development as exercise is to physical development.61 He explains
that interest enables individuals to sustain attention to complex
objects. He says that the activation of interest at the neurological
level involves a moderate increase in the density of neural firing.
"Carroll E. Izard Human Emotiont. NY, NY: Plenum Press, 1977. p. 11.
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Interest provides amplification of the physiological function required
for prolonged and fatiguing work or play. Interest also plays a role in
the development of competencies and skills and in the development
of intelligence.
Interest is not only a necessary support of perception but of
the state of wakefulness. Indeed insomnia may be produced
not only by disturbing negative affect but also by sustained
intense excitement. Again, without interest the development
of thinking and the conceptual apparatus would be seriously
impaired.
The interrelationships between the affect of interest and the
functions of thought and memory are so extensive that
absence of the affective support of interest would jeopardize
intellectual development no less than the destruction of brain
tissue. To think, as to engage in any other human activity,
one must care, one must be excited, must be continuously
rewarded. There is no human competence which can be
achieved in the absence of a sustaining
interest...62
3.1.2.4. 0. H. Mowrer
Mowrer, like Tomkins, believes that emotions play a major role
in organizing, sustaining, and motivating behavior. He stresses the
role that emotions play in changes in behavior or performance which
represent learning. He says that emotions are a prerequisite for
learning. To Mowrer, negative emotions signal distress or pain and
produce avoidance reactions. Positive emotions, on the other hand,
signal success or reward. Mowrer explains that it is the inner subjec-
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tive experience of emotion that provides the ongoing emotional state
that modifies, controls, and directs behavior. Mowrer attacks the
tendency in Western civilization to look upon the emotions with dis
trust and contempt and to elevate the intellect (reason and logic)
above them. He says:
If the present analysis is sound, the emotions are of quite
extraordinary importance in the total economy of living
organisms and do not deserve being put into opposition with
intelligence. The emotions are, it seems, themselves a high
order of
intelligence.63
Mowrer also discusses the involuntary nature of emotions. He
explains that emotions are always automatic and involuntary. He
says:
It is incorrect to blame the emotions for psychological
problems since the emotions are not a result of willful or
deliberate choice. We can choose to behave or misbehave,
but we cannot choose or control emotions, directly or
voluntarily. Given the appropriate (condition) stimulus, they
occur automatically, reflexly.
According to Mowrer it is mistaken to assume that the emotions are
at fault in psychopathology. He feels that it is the cognitions and
actions that are interacting with the emotions that are at fault.
Mowrer's view is that behavior is a result of choice, or, in a broader
sense, the result of character.
"Carroll E. Izard ffunum Emotiom. NY, NY: Plenum Press, 1977. p. 229.
"Ibid. p. 3.
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To Mowrer there are certain emotions that are more important
than others. He explains that guilt, for example, develops as a func
tion of the learning process. As a child is rewarded for good behavior,
and punished for bad behavior, he gradually develops a sense of
proper and improper behavior. Guilt, he explains, is actually a type
of fear. It arises after performing a previously punished act. Anxiety
also plays a role in learning and can, like guilt, prevent previously
punished actions from repeating. Hope is an emotion that can insti
gate and direct behavior. He describes it as a conditioned form of
positive reinforcement. Fear, to Mowrer, is a psychological warning of
impending discomfort which one tries to avoid.
3.1.2.5. S. Schachter and J. Singer
These two researchers have developed a theory of emotions
called the Two Factor Theory. They stress the importance of physio
logical arousal and cognitive appraisal. It is Schachter who began to
look at the importance of cognition in defining the type of emotion
felt during a state of physiological arousal. Arousal provides the tur
bulence, but cognition is necessary to label the emotion. Schachter
refuted Freud's view of the negative aspects of emotions and stressed
their organizing and constructive functions. He says that people are
"Carroll E. Izard Human Emotion!. NY, NY: Plenum Press, 1977. p. 105.
Lorraine D'Ortona Masters Thesis
62
always experiencing some type of emotion, and that there is no
action without affect. Schachter has outlined three major points:
(1) Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual
has no immediate explanation, he will
"label" this state and
describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him...
(2) Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual
has a completely appropriate explanation..., no evaluative needs
will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in
terms of [any] alternative cognitions available... .
(3) Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will
react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the
extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal.65
Singer and Schachter carried out many experiments trying to
test their hypothesis. In one experiment, research participants were
told that they were going to be testing a new kind of vitamin that
could have an effect on vision. The drug that was actually given was
epinephrine. It has the effect of producing the physiological state of
arousal that normally goes along with an emotional experience. Some
participants were told that they might experience some outward
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effects of the vitamin including: shaking hands, heart rate increase
and pounding, and a flushed face. These are true and accurate side
effects of epinephrine. Other participants were given no information
at all about the effects of the drug. The subjects were divided into
two groups and members of each group were put into different situa
tions. Members of one group were put into a room with a person who
was aware of the true nature of the experiment and who behaved in
a euphoric and happy manner. The other group was also put into a
room with another person, also aware of the experiment, who acted
angry. The informed individuals showed little or no tendency towards
euphoria or anger. The uninformed participants in contrast were
happy following the experience with the euphoric person, and angry
when subjected to the angry person. The results meant that when
individuals were physically aroused, their emotions depended at least
in part on how they perceived the situation. They did not consider
themselves to be in an emotional state until they were placed in a
situation in which they were led into making the evaluation or
appraisal peculiar to some emotion. The informed participants
explained their arousal on the
"vitamin"
given to them. The uni
formed participants explained their bodily sensations by adopting the
mood of the confederate in the experiment. This showed that given
"George Mandler Mind And Emotion. NY, NY: John WUey and Sons, 1975 p. 88.
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the same state of arousal, the nature of the expressed emotion can be
manipulated by manipulations of the social situation. Schachter
says:
Precisely the same state of physiological arousal could be
"joy"
or
"fury"
or any great diversity of emotional labels,
depending on the cognitive aspects of the situation.66
Schachter then believes that the physiological arousal is the same for
all emotions, and it is the interpretation of the arousal by the indivi
dual that results in emotional experience.
3.1.2.6. Carroll Izard
Izard's theory of emotions is called the Differential Emotions
Theory. He believes that emotions are the principal motivational sys
tem and the personality processes that give meaning and significance
to human existence. He describes emotions as complex processes with
neurophysiological, neuromuscular, and phenomenological aspects. He
says that the experiencing of emotion can arise independently of cog
nition. To Izard, the emotions are based on both learned and innate
processes. They also effect perception and cognition in that emotions
can alter them. He explains that perception is like a prediction or
wager based on past experience. Our perception is colored by our
wants, desires, and purposes. Our emotions act like a filter to modify
"Gregory Kimble. Principle! OfPtychdogy. NY, NY: John WUey and Sons, 1984. p. 326.
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raw sensory data and as an organizer of this data. To Izard, emotions
are non-rational and non-linear.
Izard also places importance on the role of facial expressions of
emotions. They serve the purpose of regulation and control. He
believes that emotions are both innate and learned. Izard believes
there are ten fundamental emotions. These include:
(1) Interest and excitement. He says that these emotions have the
capacity to facilitate intuition and creativity. They also provide
much of the motivation for learning and the development of
skills, analytical intellectual processes, and competencies. He
says that interest results from an increase in neural stimulation,
sometimes brought upon by change or novelty. The emotion of
interest can restrict or focus attention, cognition, and perception
so as to immerse the individual in a subject, and to free the
mind of interferences. Daydreaming and fantasies help to
amplify interest.
(2) Joy. To Izard, joy is a highly desirable emotion that along with
interest guarantees that humans will be social creatures. Joy can
also facilitate intuition and tactical knowledge.
(3) Surprise. This emotion results with a sharp increase in neural
stimulation. It serves the function of clearing the nervous
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system of ongoing emotion and cognition so that the individual
can react appropriately to the new stimulus.
(4) Distress and Anguish. They serve the purpose of communicating
to the self and to others, that things are not well, and then
motivating the person to change the situation.
(5) Anger. This emotion serves a useful function in evolution. He
says that anger can be justified when it provides the added
source of strength necessary to respond to oppression or threat.
(6) Disgust. This emotion has the function of motivating behavior
to change things that are wrong.
(7) Contempt. Izard says it is difficult to find a good use for this
emotion in our lives. It does tend to motivate our actions to pos
sibly change situations that we look upon with contempt.
(8) Fear. Izard says that fear is activated by a rapid increase in
neural stimulation, brought on by imagined or real danger. It
provides the motivation to escape from danger.
(9) Shame. Shame usually occurs in the context of relationships
with other people. It motivates a desire to hide or flee. It is a
powerful source of conformity. It serves as a guardian to self-
respect. It can foster self corrective and self improvement
behavior.
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(10) Guilt. This emotion occurs in situations where one feels perso-
naly responsible. Guilt can stimulate thought and cognitive
evaluation of the wrongdoing.67
3.1.2.7. Magda Arnold
Arnold's approach to emotions is very unique. She stresses the
importance of the subjective feeling of emotions, especially as the
main tool in the study of emotions. She analyzes emotions based on
the experiences of people and common sense. Arnold defines an emo
tion as a sequence of events described by the concepts of perception
and appraisal. She says that emotions are a non-rational attraction or
repulsion that follows upon the appraisal of something as good or bad
for the perceiver. This appraisal is direct, intuitive, and immediate,
following perception, and recognized only upon introspection. In
Arnold's words:
We can define emotion as the felt tendency toward anything
intuitively appraised as being good (beneficial), or away from
anything intuitively appraised as bad (harmful). This
attraction or aversion is accompanied by a pattern of
physiological changes organized toward approach or
withdrawal. The patterns differ for different emotions.68
Arnold stresses not just the organizing effect of emotions, but
the disorganizing effect that emotions can have on one's life.
"Carroll E. Izard Human Emotiom. NY, NY: Plenum Press, 1977. p. 85-92.
Magda Arnold Emotion and Penonality. Vol 1. NY, NY: Columbia University Press, 1960. p. 182.
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Emotional distractions are constantly present in our lives. They can
keep us from doing work that needs to be done. If we are working on
a difficult task, our attention can be drawn to something appraised
as being more desirable. This appraisal leading to a strong desire is
not necessarily final though. Arnold says we will reflect on the situar
tion, weigh our alternatives, and the desire is either counterbalanced
or reinforced by deliberate judgement. Although Arnold stresses the
negative aspects of emotions, she also believes that there are positive
emotions. These include; love and admiration, love of beauty, joy,
mirth and laughter, and happiness.
Arnold has also studied the neurophysiology of emotion. Her
idea is that the limbic system is the key to emotions and more specif
ically it is hippocampus which receives nerve impulses from the cor
tex, which then relays this information to the subcortex. As part of
her complete research of emotions, Arnold has also studied the phy
siological changes that are produced in emotion. She explains that
an emotional action initiates a pattern of neural impulses activating
voluntary and involuntary muscles and impulses inducing autonomic
and endocrine changes.
*Magda Arnold Emotion and Penonality. Vol 1. NY, NY: Columbia University Press, 1960. p. 31.
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3.1.3. Summary
Many other theories of emotions are also relevant to our current
study. Some important researchers are Mandler, Leeper, McDougall,
Plutchick, Lazarus, Papez, McClean, Buck, Lyons, and Bower. There is
also discussion of emotions in philosophical literature to be explored.
This literature includes writers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes,
Kant, Hume, Descartes, and Locke.
In this section I have tried to present evidence in regards to my
hypothesis concerning the emotions and intelligence. Tomkins, for
example, stresses the two-way interaction that exists between emotions
and cognition. Emotions affect cognition, and cognition affects emo
tions. He stresses the importance of emotions in organizing behavior and
he discusses the importance of the emotion of interest in intellectual
development.
Mowrer's idea on the necessity of emotions in the learning process
could imply that an intelligent machine, who of course must have a
learning component, must then have an emotional component. Like
Tomkins he feels that the emotions have the function of motivating and
directing behavior. He says that the emotions are a type of intellectual
process themselves.
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Schachter says that there can be no motor activity without affect.
(This is exactly what Scanlon and Johnson have proposed and used in
their design of Pacrat, which will be presented in the next section).
Izard's ideas are also very supportive of my hypothesis, especially
those relating to emotions and creativity, intuition, cognition, and per
ception. He feels that emotions have the ability to facilitate intuition
and creativity - two concepts that I feel are involved in human intelli
gence and reasoning. He also feels that emotions have the function of
altering perception and cognition.
It seems that if we are to build machines that share at least some
of the capabilities of human intelligence, then we must study psycholog
ical theories that explain how human intelligence is developed and
maintained and what types of processes interact with it. In summary,
emotions are one of these processes. They directly affect our intellec
tual processes of reasoning, thinking, and problem-solving.
3.2. MARVIN MINSKY ON THE EMOTIONS
Marvin Minsky wrote, "The question is not whether intelligent
machines can have any emotions, but whether machines can be intelligent
without any
emotions."70Minsky defines intelligence as processes in our
minds that enable us to solve problems we consider difficult. These
"Marvin Minsky The Society OfMind NY, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1985. p. 163.
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processes, however, are not well understood. The concept of emotions is
also something that is not well understood. Minsky says that although
many people believe that thoughts and feeling are very separate and dif
ferent things, they are nevertheless very much related; feelings are like
types of thoughts.
Minsky believes that intelligent behavior is goal directed and involves
problem solving. He also believes that intelligence is influenced by our
emotional states. This influence comes in many forms and works in dif
ferent ways.
3.2.1. Background Information
Minsky believes that people are born with some type of basic,
instinctual needs. He calls these "proto-specialists". They include goals
such as thirst, hunger, warmth, and defense. We accomplish these goals
through the use of our body, including the sense organs which carry out
our human activities. Instinct, however, is not the whole picture. Min
sky says we create new goals, besides the instinctual ones, throughout
our whole lifetime. These new goals come about through many years of
elaborate concept formation and life experiences. Thus, our goals are a
combination of the instinctual and the learned.
Minsky feels that the mind needs some type of built in constraints,
and checks and balances to guide us towards these goals. These checks
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are also used to keep us from following goals that lead to self-
destruction. To Minsky, pleasure and pain are concepts that can accom
plish this. He sees them as being very powerful. They can undermine
one's interest in anything that is not immediate. They simplify our
point of view. Pain can distract us from dangerous goals and help us to
survive. Minsky says that we seek behavior that rewards us with pleas
ure, and avoids that which brings us pain. Minsky sees emotions as
working with the intellect to attain goals. I will now explain specific
examples of how these two concepts interact.
3.2.2. The Interaction Of Emotions and the Intellect
3.2.2.1. Emotion's role in motivation and self-control
In trying to achieve a goal, we must keep working even while
under duress; and we must not be easily distracted. We also must
not lose sight of our goal and the intermediate steps of progress we
make along the way. Minsky says that in order to do this we use
weird things to control ourselves and keep ourselves motivated.
These things include fantasies, and in some cases even lies. Minsky
asks, Why can't we just tell ourselves to do what we want to do? He
explains that that if we were easily able to switch from one goal to
the next too rapidly, we'd never get anything done. If we could just
switch off hunger and pain, we would have serious problems.
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Therefore, we must have checks and balances to keep us working
towards our goals, while using our intellect.
To explain the above point, Minsky uses the following example.
Suppose a man is working on a very difficult problem. Although he is
tired and becoming bored, he conjures up a fantasy of a challenger
working on the same problem, who is getting close to completion.
The man imagines this, and then feels an angry wish to frustrate this
challenger. This forces him to continue working. The man is using
emotions in order to accomplish an intellectual purpose. He may not
be able to make himself angry, simply by deciding to be angry, but
he can still imagine objects or situations that make him angry.
Tricks such as these to continue being motivated and to control
our behavior are used to reward ourselves for an accomplishment.
Some examples of these tricks are:
(1) The use of statements such as,"If I get this done, I'll have more
time for other things."
(2) The use of willpower by telling ourselves, "Don't do
that."
(3) The use of activity like moving around and exercise.
(4) The use of expressions such as: set jaw, stiff upper lip.
(5) The use of coffee or drugs.
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(6) The use of emotion with statements such as, "If I win there is
much to gain, but more to lose if I fail. "If I get this done, I'll
have more time for other things." And imagining admiration
upon success or disapproval upon failure. Thus, according to
Minsky, we make ourselves behave and control our motivation
by exploiting our own fears and desires, or by offering ourselves
rewards, or by threatening loss of what we love.
3.2.2.2. The involvement of emotions in intellectual application and
development
Minsky says that confusion and pain stimulate us to apply our
intellect. To explain this he uses the example of a man who, through
injury, develops problems walking. In order to walk now, he must
think about walking, and now use his intellect for something that
was once automatic.
Minsky asks why emotions are supposedly harder to explain
than intellect? Many people view emotions such as anger as non-
rational. If we look, though, at the challenger example discussed ear
lier in this section, the use of anger by the man can certainly be seen
as a conscious rational process.
Minsky says that intellectual development can depend upon
attachments to other people whom we want to please, and upon fear
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and dread of disappointing those we look up to. We can make emo
tional/ intellectual attachments to people, and want to feel/think the
way certain people do. Thus, emotional attachments can inspire us to
improve and develop our intellectual capacities.
3.2.2.3. Emotions and Learning
Minsky says that people do not learn well unless they are
interested or concerned. We learn from our mistakes, and we also
learn from our successes. He says that every machine that has the
capacity to learn must have some type of protective scheme, or oth
erwise, it could get trapped endlessly repeating the same activity.
This mechanism keeps us from wasting time.
We also need some type of controlling mechanism over our
pleasure systems that might try to reach beyond the limit of ordi
nary pleasure or reward. To explain this idea, Minsky gives the com
mon example of eventually becoming bored with a task we once
thought was pleasant. It seems as though we need a variety of pur
poses and goals, and through the satisfaction of these goals we learn
and become intelligent. In summary, our pleasure systems help us to
learn new things, by requiring a variety, so as to eliminate boredom,
making us investigate new concepts and ideas.
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3.2.2.4. Emotions and the Process of Transferring Goals and Values
Minsky says that brains transfer values and goals by exploiting
personal relationships we call emotional such as fear, affection, love,
hate, detachment, and dependency. Values and goals of a given cul
ture pass from one generation to the next. They are not learned the
way other skills are learned. We learn our earliest values under the
influence of attachment related signals that represent not our own
successes or failures, but our parents' love and rejection.71
3.2.2.5. Emotions as warning signs
Minsky says that to serve as useful warning signs, feelings such
as pain and hunger must be engineered not simply to indicate
dangerous conditions, but to anticipate them and warn us before too
much damage is done. He says that feelings such as pain or depres
sion are products of our
minds'
activities that are engineered to warn
us before we reach our limits. As an example, Minsky uses the idea
of the feeling of depression and discouragement that one gets when
stuck in a boring job. These feelings help us to realize that maybe we
should evaluate our situation and replace or alter our current goals.
"Marvin Minsky The Society OfMind NY, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1985. p. 181.
"Ibid. p. 286.
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Another example of this can be seen in babies. Minsky says that
infants are single minded. They seem to be usually in one of two
states that can switch suddenly. Babies do not display a mixture of
emotions, but express only one emotion at a time. He says that this
is done to increase the infant's chance of survival, since with mixed
emotions it would be even more difficult to determine what the baby
needed or wanted. The child's cries can be seen as warning signs to
the parent, and so require clarity.
3.2.2.6. Choices, Comparisons, and Compromises in Problem Solving
and Emotions
Emotional ideas such as like, prefer, and enjoy, are a sort of
measurement. They reduce things to a value. These judgements seem
to be similar to heuristics used in problem solving in artificial intelli
gence. Minsky says that the function of liking is to turn off alterna
tives. If unconstrained, it narrows down our universe.
Minsky believes that in problem solving we rarely need to know
that anything is absolutely right or wrong. Instead we just want to
make a choice between alternatives. Intelligence, then, includes
judgement which is involved in more than just determining right or
wrong, or true or false.
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3.2.2.7. Miscellaneous Thoughts
The idea of creativity is related to emotions. It is difficult to
define creativity in terms of logic or algorithmics. Minsky feels that
creativity is needed for intellectual behavior. Creativity requires the
use of imagination. We use imagination to acquire new ideas. We can
imagine things we have never seen before, or even things that do not
exist. The use of fantasies, emotional or not, is indispensable for
every complicated problem solving
process.73 Minsky is doubtful that
we use logic to solve problems or create new ideas. He says we might
use logic in the later stages of problem solving, to formulate ideas
conceived in other ways.
The other idea of interest raised by Minsky is the concept of
pretending to be in a certain emotional state to accomplish a goal.
Sometimes people threaten to develop certain negative emotional
states to get a certain result. Examples of these are seen in many
relationships. Our parents tell us that if we act in a certain way they
will become mad at us. People who are manipulative sometimes pre
tend to be angry or pleased to get what they want.
In summary, Minsky sees humans as goal driven organisms with
processes that help us carry out our goals. These goals start with the
"Marvin Minsky The Society OfMind NY, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1985. p. 163.
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instinctual and are also acquired throughout one's lifetime. Emotions
are just one of the processes that help us to live in a positive direc
tion for our being. Cognition or the intellect is also an example of one
of these processes. Cognition and emotions, along with other
processes, exist in cooperation to help us accomplish our goals.
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4. PACRAT: NON-LIVING INTELLIGENCE
In the first part of this section I will present the work of two researchers:
Mark Johnson and Ray Scanlon. They have developed a computer simula
tion of non-living intelligence, a "being" called Pacrat. Pacrat is the first
stage of an attempt at reverse engineering of the brain. Pacrat displays intel
ligent behavior under the influence of emotions. These researchers are assum
ing that emotion/motivation must be present in every intelligent being.
Pacrat is said to get angry, display intuition and curiosity, and to have an
awareness of his world and surroundings.
In the second part of this section, I will discuss the programming com
ponent to this thesis. I have rewritten Scanlon and Johnson's FORTRAN
version of Pacrat in C. Statistical results and source code will be presented.
4.1. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCANLON AND JOHNSON
4.1.1. Let's Meet Pacrat: An Introduction
The main hypothesis of my paper is that emotions and intelligent
behavior have an interdependent relationship. This implies that those
in the field of Artificial Intelligence who are attempting to build intelli
gent machines should look at this relationship and incorporate it into
their models. This is exactly what has been done with Pacrat.
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Pacrat is the work of two researchers, Mark Johnson and Ray
Scanlon at Benet Laboratories, for the U.S. Army. He is one step in
their long term goal of creating an autonomously piloted combat vehicle
that must be aware of its surroundings, able to learn, able to make com
plex decisions, and in essence, be able to think like a person. Scanlon
and Johnson write:
There is no such thing as an intelligent machine without a
thinking machine. There are cleverly programmed machines,
but there are no clever machines without a thinking machine.
We believe the only feasible approach to intelligent machine
design is through reverse engineering of the mammalian brain.
Pacrat is a computer simulation of a primitive, mammalian organism.
One important aspect of their work, which is closely related to the topic
of this paper, involves their ideas concerning the relationship between
thinking and emotion. Scanlon and Johnson point out that:
Feeling is essential because without motivation, there is nothing.
The machine must want to do things. In doing things, it will
learn; and having learned, it will think.75
According to these researchers, there is no meaningful motor activity
without some form of motivation. In order to do anything like a human,
including thinking, they feel a machine must be motivated like a
human.
"Raymond Scanlon and Mark Johnson. "Synaptogenesis"- Watervliet, NY: US Army Armament Research
Center, 1990. p. 5.
"Raymond Scanlon and Mark Johnson, "Machine Emotion". IEEE Spring Compcon. Wash, DC: Computer
Society Press Of the IEEE, 1988. p 403.
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4.1.2. What is Pacrat Really Like?
4.1.2.1. Pacrat And His World
Pacrat's world is a 21 x 21 grid on a computer screen. One loca
tion on the grid, row 11 column 1, is his home. Food can be found in
two other alternating locations: row 3 column 18, and row 11 column
18. Each location on the grid has four weights associated with it that
represent Pacrat's probability of moving to the next location north,
south, east, or west. Paths to food and home are reinforced through
the adjusting of these weights by Pacrat's reward system. Pacrat's
primary motivations are hunger and fear. When hungry, he leaves his
burrow and sets out to search for food. It is during this search that
Pacrat has many experiences, including various forms of thinking and
feelings. After eating, Pacrat is motivated by fear of open places,
agoraphobia, and scurries back to his home. There Pacrat will sleep
until he becomes hungry again.
The intent is for Pacrat to behave in his world as a mammal
would, and so he is created with some of the capabilities and emo
tions of a living animal. He has the ability to sleep, to be awake, to
move, and to eat. He has a stomach, a nose, and a sense of location.
Pacrat also displays anger, curiosity and boredom.
Lorraine D'Ortona Masters Thesis
83
Scanlon and Johnson have provided Pacrat with three distinct
forms of thinking.
(1) The type of thinking which occurs when sensory input is tem
porarily blocked, and motor input is inhibited. Pacrat has been
given the ability to evaluate the consequences of his last move,
and also the awareness that a current action may have impor
tant connotations. This is called association.
(2) The capacity of recognition, which is learned from previous
successes and rewards. This occurs when Pacrat arrives at a
location where he has found food in the past.
(3) The ability to think of more efficient paths to food. Scanlon and
Johnson claim that this is insight, which to them is the most
basic mechanism of rational thought.76
4.1.2.2. Pacrat's Anatomy
Pacrat is a model of a mammalian brain. His brain has eight
components. These include the ascending reticular activating sub
stance (RAS), the thalamus, the hypothalamus, the amygdala, the
cingulate gyrus, the median forebrain bundle, the hippocampus, and
the isocortex. A block diagram of Pacrat's brain is included at the
'Raymond Scanlon and Mark Johnson, "Machine Emotion". IEEE Spring Compcon. Washington, DC:
Computer Society Press Of the IEEE, 1988. p. 405.
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end of this thesis, and details of these brain parts will be discussed in
a later section. These centers are modeled based on their functional
relationships. The attempt is not to model the response of individual
neurons, but only the activity of groups of neurons which Scanlon
and Johnson call codons. A codon is a record or result of an experi-
ence. More specifically it is a vector that represents the state of
Pacrat at a given instant. The variables that make up this state are:
1) the number of a sensory neuron, that is 1 - 441, each being a locar
tion on the grid, 2) his dominant emotional state, 3) the values that
make up the state of the amygdala and thalamus, (These are the
amygnt, which is active when Pacrat is eating. The thalgl, which is
also active when Pacrat is eating. The thalnt, which is active when
Pacrta is thinking. The thalbd, which is active if Pacrat is thinking
and arrives at a food spot.), 4) the number of the previously active
codon, that is, the location Pacrat was at before, and 5) the time she
arrived at the current location. On a lower level of anatomy, this
state could represent a specific configuration of active neurons in the
brain.
Pacrat also has four motor neurons that are controlled by the
isocortex. Pacrat receives sensory input from the environment. This
"Raymond Scanlon and Mark Johnson, "Machine
Emotion" IEEE Spring Compcon. Washington, DC:
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input is relayed to the isocortex under the influence of the dominant
emotion.
4.1.2.2.1. Details Of Pacrat's Brain
4.1.2.2.2. The Hypothalamus
The hypothalamus is the area of Pacrat's brain that deals
with hunger. Pacrat's stomach has sensory neurons lining it that
signal the activity of the stomach. The activity of these neurons is
represented by a scalar that continuously decreases until Pacrat is
eating. As Pacrat gets hungry his hunger center becomes more
active; after he has eaten, the activity quiets down. The
hypothalamus also deals with Pacrat's anger. In this case certain
codons in the isocortex that have been influenced by the amygdala
become active. This model is sound in that in humans the
hypothalamus is also thought to be the seat of hunger and
involved with anger.
4.1.2.2.3. The Cingulate Gyrus
Fear is defined as the level of activity present in the cingulate
gyrus. When Pacrat is out of his burrow, and his hunger is satis
fied, sensory neurons excite the cingulate gyrus and produce
Computer Society Press Of the IEEE, 1988. p. 403.
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agoraphobia, fear of open places. Pacrat must get home in order to
get relief. Doing so activates his reward system. Some literature
has shown that the hypothalamus is involved in fear. See Arnold
(1960). In humans the cingulate gyrus can inhibit or facilitate
action depending on the appraisal of such action as appropriate or
inappropriate.
4.1.2.2.4. The Hippocampus
The hippocampus is the area of Pacrat's brain that produces
curiosity. It begins by the activation of a new codon. A record is
kept of Pacrat's previously active codons, and an unsuccessful
search determines newness. For example, if Pacrat is at sensory
neuron 50 for the first time, is afraid (dominant emotion 2), and
has come from sensory neuron 49, this information, along with the
four values that represent the state of her thalamus and amygdala
(let's say they are all 0) and the present time, are the values that
make up her currently active codon. This information is recorded
for future use. This codon is considered to be new. If later in the
trial he again moves to neuron 50, but is hungry and/or comes
from neuron 51, this is also considered to be a new codon and is
recorded. If in later trials Pacrat again arrives at neuron 50 from
neuron 49, is afraid, and her thalgl and amygnt are both 0, this
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would be considered a reactivation of an old codon. In this case
the time of this codon is changed to the present time, and no new
record is kept.
Pacrat's hippocampus affects his motor activity so that some
thing new encourages him to explore his world. In humans, the
hippocampus is involved in memory. It allows us to recall things
that have been previously experienced, and also whether the
experiences were liked or disliked. It also may be involved with a
period of hesitation or deliberation that sometimes precedes action
in humans.
4.1.2.2.5. The Thalamus
The functions of Pacrat's thalamus include receiving all sen
sory input except olfactory, and the management of Pacrat's
thinking. The thalamus can relay this input to the isocortex or
block it altogether. If sensory input to the isocortex is blocked,
Pacrat experiences thinking. His motor activity is inhibited, but
he thinks about moving to other locations on the grid. If the
thalamus does not block the sensory input to the cortex, Pacrat
will move to a new location on the grid. It is speculated that the
thalamus in humans mediates the sleep state. It can increase or
decrease the excitability of the cortex, and can inhibit motor and
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sensory areas.
4.1.2.2.6. The Amygdala
In humans, the amygdala is thought to be the seat of imagi
nation. It is thought to work closely with the hippocampus in
imagining sensory experiences and what might or can be done
about them. In Pacrat anger is experienced through the
hypothalamus and isocortex, under direction of the amygdala.
When Pacrat is searching for food, and he does not find it in a
familiar location, Pacrat becomes angry. The amygdala becomes
active, and forces Pacrat out of that location, and into new ran
dom locations where food may be found. This is accomplished by
temporarily making each of Pacrat's weights equal. These weights
represent the probability of his moving from his current location
either north, south, east, or west. In Emotion and Personality
Arnold points out that:
As soon as a man appraises something as annoying, and
feels anger (whether he expresses it or not), he
immediately imagines what to do to fight effectively, even
if all he does is use bad language. Such motor fantasies
seem to be mediated via the amygdala and the frontal
association areas, and reinforce the anger and attack as
well as directing it.
"Magda Arnold, Emotion And Pertonality, NY, NY: Columbia University Press, 1960. p. 188.
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4J..2.2.7. The Reticular Ascending Substance - RAS
The RAS in humans is thought to maintain the waking state
and act as a relay during the appraisal of sensory input. In Pacrat
it becomes excited whenever the hypothalamus or the cingulate
gyrus is active. This means that if Pacrat is hungry or afraid the
RAS becomes excited. If Pacrat is neither hungry nor afraid he
just goes to sleep as the RAS becomes inactive.
4.1.2.2.8. The Medial Forebrain Bundle - MFB
In Pacrat the MFB serves as a reward-punishment mechan
ism whenever activity in the hypothalamus or cingulate gyrus is
reduced. If Pacrat has reached food in a number of moves that is
less than a running average, he is rewarded. Going back 30 moves,
the weights of Pacrat's previous locations are adjusted so that this
path to food will be preferred by Pacrat in the future. The
reward is highest for the most recent codon and is less for those
codons that have been active farthest in the past. This is con
sidered to be learning, and will cause Pacrat to search for food in
locations where it has been found before. This mechanism works
the same when Pacrat is scared and finds his way home. The
weights on his path are adjusted to reinforce this path for future
trials. Because Pacrat's current state and the weights associated
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with it can be seen as an assemblage of active neurons, Scanlon
and Johnson explain that in the Pacrat simulation this serves the
purpose of reinforcing recently fired
synapses.79
4.1.3. Why a Thinking, Feeling Machine?
4.1.3.1. We Think With Feeling
Scanlon and Johnson are attempting to create what they call
non-living intelligence. They want to duplicate the functions of the
brain in electronic circuits. They point to the existence of the brain
as proof that a thinking machine exists, and then consider the possi
bility that it can be duplicated.
The researchers hypothesize that there are three main processes
involved in the life of a organism that has a brain. These are motiva
tion, cognition, and motor activity.
The most important constraint on our work is that without
motivation-emotion there is no cognition, no motor activity.
If we would have a thinking machine, then we must look to a
feeling-thinking machine for there is no
other.80
These three components are all present in Pacrat. He wants to do
things, he does them, and he thinks. The function of emotion and
motivation are to guide the organism through its world.
R. Scanlon and M. Johnson, "Machine Emotion" IEEE Spring Compcon. Wash., DC: Computer Society
Press Of the IEEE, 1988. p. 404.
"R. Scanlon and M. Johnson. "Experiences With A Feeling-Thinking Machine". 1987 IEEE International
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4.1.3.2. Thinking and Feeling are not Rule-Based or Logical
In order to build a Pacrat with emotion-motivation and think
ing, Scanlon and Johnson have rejected the more traditional methods
of AI: expert systems, rule-based programs, and predicate calculus.
These researchers feel that these techniques have failed thus far to
produce intelligent behavior or thinking, especially human intelli
gence and human thinking. Scanlon and Johnson feel that Pacrat,
like humans, must think in an non-rational manner, with emotion.
They reject the notion that humans only reason with formal logic.
This opinion has also been expressed by Minsky in The Society Of
Mind as discussed earlier in this thesis. He feels that logic has been
shown to be unreliable. Rules to be used in the process of reasoning
are difficult to state explicitly and entirely. Minsky asks,
Why do people think emotion is harder to explain than
intellect? Is anger always non-rational? Why is it a popular
view that emotions are inherently more complex and harder
to understand than other aspects of human
thought?81
To Scanlon and Johnson, expert systems do not deal well with
uncertainty or the unexpected. This would be a serious drawback in
any kind of war situation, or in every day life situations as well. This
is another reason why they have rejected the expert system
Conference On Neural Networkt. Wash, DC: Computer Society Press Of The IEEE, 1987. Vol 2. p. 72.
"Marvin Minsky. The Society OfMind. NY, NY: WUey and Sons, 1985. p. 172.
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approach, and have embraced the techniques of neural networks and
human brain modeling. There are some in the field who agree with
this view that neural nets may be the answer to recreating a mind
and that "traditional AI" has failed. This view is held by Dreyfus as
explored earlier in this thesis. There also are others who believe that
neither neural nets nor any fancy technological trick will ever pro
duce a truly intelligent being.
4.1.4. The Future of Pacrat
The version of Pacrat described above is actually step two in an
on-going process. The initial program was called "mouse". This program
displayed learning similar to Pacrat, but it could not think, and was not
motivated by emotion. Presently Scanlon and Johnson are investigating
the neuronal activity of the brain instead of just the functional relation
ship between its parts. They are also subdividing Pacrat's eight brain
centers to into smaller anatomical parts, so as to eventually complete a
reverse engineering of the human brain.
4.1.5. Final Remarks
According to Scanlon and Johnson, if the brain can perform the
functions that we are trying to produce, then we should put our efforts
towards modeling and recreating it. Thus, to these researchers, the first
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step in creating an intelligent organism is to supply it with motivation
and emotion, the ability to think, the ability to learn, and the ability to
get around in the world. Intelligence will come when these capacities
are put in place.
4.2. MY IMPLEMENTATION OF PACRAT - MS. PACRAT
4.2.1. Program Introduction
For the programming component to this thesis I have taken Scan
lon and Johnson's Pacrat program and reprogrammed it in C. Their
program was written in Fortran IV and ran on an IBM 4341. My C pro
gram runs on an AT&T 3B2/600 and an AT&T 3B1. I have also writ
ten a graphics program that displays Ms. Pacrat moving on a grid. This
graphics component uses the 3B1 graphics display. Ms. Pacrat has also
been run on a VAX system running ULTRLX. Because of its speed, the
VAX machine allows for a more efficient observation of Ms. Pacrat's
behavior after hundreds of trials.
4.2.2. The Coding ofMs. Pacrat
The program I received from Scanlon and Johnson was an uncom-
mented hard-copy listing. Unfortunately this listing was the only thing
that they could find from the old version of Pacrat. No electronic copies
were saved and I was not guaranteed the the listing I received was a
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working program. I began my coding using a strictly syntactical transla
tion from FORTRAN to C. Athough this was my first experience with
the programming language FORTRAN, I did not find the translation
process to be too difficult, and I now feel I have a good working
knowledge of a new language. Although I had a basic idea of what the
program was supposed to accomplish, the fact that the listing was
uncommented made it quite difficult to understand by just reading the
code. Once I had a running C program I began a massive debugging
campaign. I first investigated the nature of the major data structures of
the program by printing them out and examining their values. Eventu
ally I began to understand how Pacrat works.
During this process I was able to communicate with Ray Scanlon,
who works in Watervilet, N.Y., through the ethernet. Ray answered
many questions for me and was of great help during difficult times. He
is a very interesting man, with many years of experience in the field of
computer science. He also considers himself to be a philosopher, allow
ing for stimulating discussion.
4.2.3. Experiences with the Pacrat program
One of the most interesting aspects of writing this program con
cerns the major data structures of the program. FORTRAN does not
support dynamic storage allocation, and so does not have pointers. It
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also does not have structures as in C. This requires the use of multi
dimensional arrays in place of C structures. For me, this was a new
experience.
Another aspect of the program that was quite different from my
previous programming experiences concerns the nature of local variables
in FORTRAN. Again, because of the lack of dynamic allocation, local
variables to a subroutine retain their values when the subroutine is
called again. At first I was unaware of this fact, which caused me con
fusion and a misunderstanding of many variables. Once I realized this, I
was able to make great strides in my program translation.
4.2.4. Program Results
Included at the end of this thesis are graphs showing Ms. Pacrat's
learning. The x-axis shows the trial number and the y-axis shows the
average number of moves it takes Ms. Pacrat to get to food or to home
for each 10 trials. The results are shown for the paths to each food spot
separately and the path from each food spot to home.
Ms. Pacrat tends to learn one food spot quicker and better than
the other. After observing many trial runs, it seems her tendency is to
learn the closer food spot first, row 11 column 18. She does however
have runs where she learns the food spot at row 3 column 18 first.
When she learns a food spot, Ms. Pacrat's tendency is to continue to go
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to this spot even though food is not there. The function of her amyg
dala is to combat this behavior. Interestingly enough, Scanlon men
tioned this behavior to me. He says that Ms. Pacrat is exhibiting obses
sive compulsive behavior.
4.2.4.1. Graph Specifics
Graph 1 shows the average number of moves it takes Ms.
Pacrat to get to the food location at row 11 column 18. This is also
referred to as food spot 2. For early trials I have seen averages as
high as 1000 moves. As the graph shows, this number decreases so
that by 1000 trials his average number of moves to this food spot
ranges from 30 to 20.
Graph 2 shows Ms. Pacrat's results for food spot 1 at row 3
column 18. The average number of moves decreases, but tends to
bottom out at approximately 80 moves.
Graph 3 shows Ms. Pacrat learning her way from the food spot
at row 3 column 18 to home. This task is accomplished easily by Ms.
Pacrat after 1000 trials. Graph 4 shows Graph 3 in sharper detail,
setting the y-axis at 300 instead of 1000.
Graph 5 shows the average number of moves it takes Ms.
Pacrat to go from the food spot at row 11 column 18 to home. These
results are very similar to Graph 3. Ms. Pacrat has no problem
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learning her way home from either food location. Graph 6 shows
Graph 5 using 300 for the y-axis.
Graphs 6 and 7 show the average number of moves it takes Ms.
Pacrat to go to food and back home again without making a distinc
tion between the two different food spots. The average to food is
higher than that to home, since in this case the average number of
moves to both food spots are combined.
4.2.4.2. Remaining Visual Displays
4.2.4.2.1. Figure 1
The first display shows Ms. Pacrat arriving at a food spot
and eating during trial 1. Ms. Pacrat's location is neuron 368, food
spot 2. Her dominant emotion is hunger (2). Notice that eating
raises the level of the variables amygnt and thalgl by .1. Also
notice where this information is now inserted into Ms. Pacrat's
codon. Here you see the active codon 368, dominant emotion
hunger (2), the values of the amygnt and thalgl in packed form
(110), the previously active codon (347) and the time of activation
of this codon denoted by ibgcnt (682). To get to this food spot,
Ms. Pacrat's last two moves were from neuron 346 to 347 to 368.
You will notice that the move partion shown is actually for codon
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347, since this was the last move taken. The first section of the
partion (north) is small because Ms. Pacrat came from 346 which
is north of 347, and so she is being discouraged from moving north
back to 346.
The second display shows Ms. Pacrat arriving at home,
afraid. Her location is neuron 11 and her dominant emotion is fear
(3). Notice that the variable soothe is now 1, meaning that her
fear is now being calmed. She is also prohibited from moving now
since the variable ainhib is 1. This variable is turned on when Ms.
Pacrat is eating, thinking, or being soothed. When Ms. Pacrat
arrives at home, scared, and is soothed, the thalgl becomes active.
Notice its value at .1.
4.2.4.2.2. Figure 2
The top display shows an example of two of Ms. Pacrat's
three forms of thinking. Notice that the thnkng variable is 1. This
snapshot is in Trial 2. Ms. Pacrat's location is sensory neuron 347.
Her path of thinking, however, places her at neuron 346. During
thinking Ms. Pacrat also associates. In this case she is associating
to neuron 367 from 346. Notice that during thinking the thalnt
becomes active. Its value is now .1. Sometime in the past neuron
346 was in a path that was rewarded. The values in iakshn 346
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show the four weights for this neuron. The first field is north, the
second field is east, the third field is south, and the fourth field is
west. The weight from 346 east to 367 has been reinforced, while
the other 3 have been reduced. Iakshn also shows us that at time
429 Ms. Pacrat moved north to 345 and associated west at time
428. It also shows the association from 346 east, to 367 at time
2407.
The second display shows an angry Ms. Pacrat. Her dom
inant emotion is anger (1). It is Trial 2 and she knows that in
Trail 1 food was found at neuron 368. Notice that her previous
location was 368, but food is now located at 360, row 3 column 18.
Ms. Pacrat's angry variable is now 1.0. Also notice that the move
partion is equally divided so that Ms. Pacrat's moves will now be
totally random.
4.2.4.2.3. Figure 3
This table shows the number of times that Ms. Pacrat is
rewarded for finding food when hungry, and getting home when
scared. It also shows the average number of moves for these
rewarded trials. Note that the number of times rewarded
decreases as Ms. Pacrat's performance improves. This is because
the running average that determines if Ms. Pacrat will be
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rewarded is a dynamic threshold that is continually lowered. This
means that as Ms. Pacrat learns, more is expected of her and once
she learns where food and home are she is no longer in need of
rewards.
4.2.4.2.4. Figure 4
This table shows the reward thresholds below which Ms.
Pacrat must be to get rewarded. These thresholds gradually
decrease as explained above. Notice that the averages for all four
paths are represented.
4.2.4.2.5. Figure 5
This shows the anatomy of Ms. Pacrat's brain. The specific
parts have been described previously in this thesis.
4.2.4.2.6. Figure 6
This shows the graphical display of Ms. Pacrat's world. The
grid size is 21 X 21. Her home is shown at location 11, 1 with an
H. Ms. Pacrat herself is represented by a shaded in rectangle, and
her association location is seen as a smaller, unshaded, rectangle.
The location of food is noted by an X.
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CYCLE STATS
?t************************************************^^^^^
TRIAL is 1 IBGCNT is 682 NUMOVE is 201
P's LOC is neuron 368: ROW 11 COL 18 P's PREV LOC is neuron 347
DOMINANT EMOTION is 2 LSUGG is 2 FOOD LOCATION is ROW 11 COL 18
ACTIVE CODON is SENSORY NEURON 368 STATE 1
PACRAT is eating
0.900000 is hungry 1.000000 is uneasy 0.000000 is angry 0.000000 is bored 0.000000 is curis
0.000000 is aintnd 1.000000 is ainhib 0 is soothe 0.100000 is stomak 0 is thnkng 1.000000 is alert
0.000000 is thalbd 0.100000 is amygnt 0.100000 is thalgl 0.000000 is thabit
0.250000 0.250000 0.25OOOO 0.250000 - weights for this codon
0.125OOO 1.000000 1.000000 0.008333 is repulse
0.010000 0.250000 0.250000 0.172917 is sugg
0.014643 0.380720 0.746797 1.000000 - move partition
Associating is 0 ISENSE is 368 368 2 0 347 0 is codon of assoc
************************************************************
icodon 368 1 is
368 2 110 347 682
iakshn 368 1 is
0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 0.250000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
CYCLE STATS
************************************************************
TRIAL is 1 IBGCNT is 1034 NUMOVE is 310
P's LOC is neuron 11: ROW 11 COL 1 P's PREV LOC is neuron 10
DOMINANT EMOTION is 3 LSUGG is 3 FOOD LOCATION is ROW 11 COL 18
ACTIVE CODON is SENSORY NEURON 11 STATE 4
0.011019 is hungry 0.900000 is uneasy 0.000000 is angry 0.000000 is bored 0.600000 is curis
0.000000 is aintnd 1.000000 is ainhib 1 is soothe 0.988981 is stomak 0 is thnkng 1.000000 is alert
0.000000 is thalbd 0.000000 is amygnt 0.100000 is thalgl 0.000000 is thalnt
0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 - weights for this codon
0.008333 1.908333 1.958333 1.000000 is repulse
0.481250 0.010000 0.485417 0.250000 is sugg
0.392323 0.400476 0.796196 1.000000 - move partition
Associating is 0 ISENSE is 11 11 3 0 10 0 is codon of assoc
************************************************************
icodon 11 4 is
11 3 10 10 1034
iakshn 11 4 is
0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 0.250000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
FIGURE 1
CYCLE STATS
?i**********************************************^,,^^^
TRIAL is 2 IBGCNT is 2407 NUMOVE is 362
P's LOC is neuron 347: ROW 11 COL 17 P's PREV LOC is neuron 348
DOMINANT EMOTION is 2 LSUGG is 2 FOOD LOCATION is ROW 3 COL 18
ACTIVE CODON is SENSORY NEURON 346 STATE 1
0.814593 is hungry 1.000000 is uneasy 0.000000 is angry 0.000000 is bored 0.800000 is curis
0.000000 is aintnd 1.000000 is ainhib 0 is soothe 0.185407 is stomak 1 is thnkng 0.814590 is alert
0.000000 is thalbd 0.000000 is amygnt 0.000000 is thalgl 0.100000 is thalnt
0.233645 0.299065 0.233645 0.233645 - weights for this codon
1.000000 0.025000 0.008333 1.000000 is repulse
0.233645 0.299065 0.233645 0.233645 is sugg
0.233645 0.532710 0.766355 1.000000 - move partition
Associating is 1 ISENSE is 0 367 2 0 346 0 is codon of assoc
************************************************************
icodon 346 1 is
346 2 1 347 2407
iakshn 346 1 is
0.233645 0.299065 0.233645 0.233645
345.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
429.000000 2407.000000 0.000000 428.000000
CYCLE STATS
************************************************************
TRIAL is 2 IBGCNT is 3905 NUMOVE is 730
P's LOC is neuron 389: ROW 11 COL 19 P's PREV LOC is neuron 368
DOMINANT EMOTION is 1 LSUGG is 2 FOOD LOCATION is ROW 3 COL 18
ACTIVE CODON is SENSORY NEURON 389 STATE 6
0.838475 is hungry 1.000000 is uneasy 1.000000 is angry 0.000000 is bored 1.000000 is curis
0.000000 is aintnd 0.000000 is ainhib 0 is soothe 0.161525 is stomak 0 is thnkng 0.838472 is alert
0.000000 is thalbd 0.000000 is amygnt 0.000000 is thalgl 0.000000 is thalnt
0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 - weights for this codon
1.608333 1.691667 1.591667 0.008333 is repulse
0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 is sugg
0.25OOOO 0.500000 0.750000 1.000000 - move partition
Associating is 0 ISENSE is 389 389 1 0 368 0 is codon of assoc
************************************************************
icodon 389 6 is
389 1 0 368 3905
iakshn 389 6 is
0.250000 0.250000 0.250000 0.250000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
FIGURE 2
REWARD DATA
REWARD AVERAGES
TRIAL
# OF TIMES
REWARDED
FOR FOOD
AVERAGE #
MOVES
# OF TIMES
REWARDED
FOR HOME
AVERAGE #
MOVES
100 54 180 58 105
200 45 96 47 67
300 41 99 52 45
400 49 86 39 38
500 39 71 46 33
600 50 67 46 33
700 51 64 31 28
800 54 58 29 27
900 53 53 35 28
1000 17 68 30 26
1100 37 65 10 25
1200 30 66 5 25
1300 26 68 10 26
1400 41 43 7 25
1500 16 67 8 26
1600 22 70 9 28
1700 20 64 3 25
1800 22 66 7 25
1900 18 62 3 25
2000 20 63 7 24
This table shows the number of times that Ms. Pacrat has been rewarded for find
ing food and getting home. It also shows the average number of moves for these
rewarded trials.
FIGURES
REWARD DATA
REWARD THRESHOLD
TRIAL
#
TO HOME
FROM FOOD 1
TO HOME
FROM FOOD 2
TO FOOD 1
FROM HOME
TO FOOD 2
FROM HOME
100 119 86 206 216
200 84 73 120 159
300 40 43 90 152
400 54 59 81 171
500 46 43 87 168
600 31 35 70 89
700 29 30 29 102
800 28 31 30 176
900 29 30 29 102
1000 30 23 22 134
1100 23 19 31 118
1200 31 20 22 110
1300 24 21 27 86
1400 29 20 23 91
1500 28 21 21 96
1600 26 21 20 81
1700 26 19 20 81
1800 23 25 19 78
1900 25 18 21 66
2000 26 20 19 62
This table shows the averages that determine if Ms. Pacrat will be rewarded. There
are four distinct averages representing the four paths from home to both foodspots
and back again.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this thesis I have examined the attempt of the field of Artificial Intel
ligence to build intelligent machines. As we have seen there have been many
successful programs created, but there is still much work to be done. Human
thought processes can be used as a model for intelligent machines. We can
reason, make decisions, and do other things that are considered to be intelli
gent. An important component to this is that we do intelligent things under
the influence of our emotions. In this thesis I have suggested that thinking
with emotion may be the key to producing intelligent behavior in machines.
Processes such as, creativity, insight, and intuition are also essential to our
thinking. Because of the role that these processes play in humans, I feel that
they deserve study and consideration in AI. The question here is, Will
machines ever be able to think as well as we do? The answer, I feel, is still
unknown, but the attempt itself is certainly interesting, worthwhile, and a
source of new and exciting insights.
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6. SOME INTERESTING QUOTES
Fancy what a game of chess would be if all the chessmen had passions
and intellects, more or less small and cunning; if you were not only
uncertain about your adversary's men, but a little uncertain about
your own; if your Knight could shuffle himself on to a new square on
the sly; if your Bishop, in disgust at your castling, could wheedle your
Pawns out of their places, and if your Pawns, hating you because
they are Pawns, could make away from their appointed posts that
you might get checkmate on a sudden. You might be the longest-
headed of deductive reasoners and yet you might be beaten by your
own Pawns. You would be especially likely to be beaten, if you
depended arrogantly on your mathematical imagination, and regarded
your passionate pieces with contempt. Yet this imaginary chess is
easy compared with a game a man has to play against his fellow-men
with other fellow-men for his instruments....
82George Eliot, 1866!
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto
because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of
symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain that is, not only
write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel
(and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its
successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made
miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed
when it cannot get what it wants.
,83
p. 1.
Professor Jefferson Lister, 1949
Since in actual human behavior motive and emotion are major
influences on the course of cognitive behavior, a general theory of
thinking and problem solving must incorporate such influences.
Herbert Simon, 196784
"Alick Elithoni and David Jones. Artificial And Human Thinking. San Franscisco, Calif: Jossey Bass Inc., 1973.
"Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett. The Mind't I. NY, NY: Basic Books Inc., 1981. p. 60.
"Keith Gunderson. Mentality And Machine!. Minneapolis, Minn: Univ. ofMinnesota Press, 1971. p. 157.
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It is possible, in human beings, for the anger to produce physical
disturbances. However, if X satisfied enough cognitive conditions he
could rightly describe himself as being very angry, despite not having
the physical symptoms. The anger could be strong, insofar as it
constantly intruded into his thoughts and decisions, and insofar as he
strongly desired to make Y suffer, and suffer a great deal.
Aaron Sloman and Monica Croucher^Sl85
The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect
their judgements.
Aristotle86
Mathematical formalizers wish to treat matters of intuition
mathematically, and make themselves ridiculous.... The mind.. ..does
it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules.
Pascal,1670.87
Certainly Dreyfus is right in maintaining that a machine which can
handle only a certain select set of sentences or objects in an ad hoc
manner should not be regarded as capable of "understanding"
anything (at least not in the same sense that humans do). But on the
other hand, it is excessive to require that one single machine be
capable of duplicating all the best performances which any human
could possibly produce. If this were part of the requirement for being
an intelligent being, then no human could qualify either.
Stuart Goldkind,1987;88
Let S be a "complete
model"
of a human being and one that could
satisfy inter alia the Turing Interrogation Test. It is, of course, not
being asserted that S, the model of a human being, is a human being,
"Aaron Sloman and Monica Croucher. "Why Robots Will Have Emotions". Ninth International Joint
Conference On AI, 1981. p. 197-202.
"William Lyons. Emotion. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980. p. 92.
"Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machine. NY, NY: The Free Press, 1986. p. 16.
"Stuart Goldkind. Machine! and Intelligence. NY, NY: Greenwood Press, 1987. p. 49.
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although we must ask ourselves whether there could arise a situation
where S and the human would be indistinguishable on one hand, or
"identical"
on the other.... It is not different to imagine the inclusion
of emotions in S. This would be necessary for survival for any S which
was to be involved in an "open society" - threatened by other species
(especially, say, homo sapiens) and competing for goal-satisfaction
and goal-needs. It would be an alarm system which would facilitate
physical activity e.g. fight and flight and would also by virtue of its
fabric have all sorts of side-effects. S's for most purposes, do not need
emotions, but to simulate human beings they do.
Frank George, 198689
It can also be argued that there is no way to build a super-intelligent
robot which also copes with a complex set of different sorts of
motives, in a partly unpredictable world, without giving that robot
mechanisms which axe capable of producing emotional states, as a
result of performing the cognitive tasks for which they are required.
That is, the possibility of having emotions may be a by-product of
being able to cope with a complex and unpredictable world in an
intelligent way. (This does not mean that every intelligent robot will
necessarily be emotional, only that it will have the ability and
abilities are not always exercised.)
90Aaron Sloman, 1984
SANDY: You've hit upon a sensitive point. I've thought about this
for a long time, I've concluded that I simply can't believe emotions
and thought can be divorced. To put it another way, I think emotions
are an automatic by-product of the ability to think.
CHRIS: That's an intersting conclusion, but what if you're wrong?
What if I produce a machine that can think but not emote? Then its
intelligence might go unrecognized because it failed to pass your kind
of test.
SANDY: I'd like you to point out to me where the boundary line
"Frank George. AI Itt PhUotophy and Neural Content. NY, NY: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1986.
p. 14,17.
"Mike Sharpies. Computer! and Thought. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1989. p. 314.
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between emotional questions and non-emotional ones lies. You might
want to ask about the meaning of a great novel. This certainly
requires the understanding of human emotions! Now is that thinking,
or mere cool calculation? You might want to ask about a subtle
choice of words. For that you need an understanding of their
connotations. Turing uses examples like this in his article. You might
want to ask for advice about a complex romantic situation. The
machine would need to know a lot about human motivations and
their roots. If it failed at this kind of task, I would not be much
inclined to say that it could think. As far as I'm concerned, thinking,
feeling, and consciousness are just different facets of one phenomenon,
and no one of them can be present without the others.
CHRIS: I still can't see that intelligence has to involve emotions.
Why couldn't you imagine an intelligence that simply calculates and
has no feeling.?
SANDY: A couple of answers here. Number one, any intelligence has
to have motivations. It's simply not the case, whatever many people
may think, that machines could think any more "objectively" than
people do. Machines, when they look at a scene, will have to focus
and filter that scene down into some preconceived categories, just as
a person does. And that means seeing some things and missing others.
It means giving more weight to some things than others. This
happens on every level of processing.
PAT: I'm not sure I'm following you.
SANDY: Take me right now, for instance. You might think I'm just
making some intellectual points, and I wouldn't need emotions to do
that. But what makes me CARE about these points? Just now why
did I stress the word "care" so heavily? Because I'm emotionally
involved in this conversation! People talk to each other out of
conviction not out of hollow, mechanical reflexes. Even the most
intellectual conversation is driven by underlying passions. There's an
emotional undercurrent to every conversation it's the fact that the
speakers want to be listened to, understood, and respected for what
they are saying.
PAT: It sounds to me as if all you're saying is that people need to be
interested in what they're saying, otherwise a conversation dies.
SANDY: Right! I wouldn't bother to talk to anyone if I weren't
motivated by interest. And "interest" is just another name for a
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whole constellation of subconscious biases.
Douglas R. Hofstadter,198591
I do believe the following: 1)affective phenomena are rich and varied;
2) their relation to intellect and cognition is far from clear; and
therefore 3) they deserve a lot more study, even in AI.
John Haugeland, 198592
It must be said that AI researchers and cognitive scientists have
generally tended to avoid the subject of emotion, preferring to
concentrate instead on the purely cognitive aspects of intelligence.
But some things are clear enough. For example, psychologists
generally agree that one major function of emotions is to focus our
attention, to help us decide what is important in the world. When
someone is frightened by a spider, that spider is very important; for
the moment, at least, nothing else seems to exist. When we are
moved by a play or a piece of music, we tend to forget ourselves and
our surroundings as we watch. Furthermore, if we define emotion in a
very broad sense, it's also clear that it serves to define our long-term
goals and motives. Thus, an ambitious person may shape his or her
entire career in ways that satisfy a need for the approval of others, or
for the security of money. An extremely shy person may do just the
opposite, choosing a life-style that avoids confrontations with others.
M.Mitchell Waldrop, 1987193
"Douglas R. Hofstadter. Metamagical Themat. NY, NY: Basic Books, 1985. p. 502.
"John Haugeland. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985. p. 237.
"M. Mitchell Waldrop. Man-Made Mindt. USA: Walker and Company, 1987. p. 131.
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